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7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQLWV&RXUWRI-XVWLFHDQGµ6XSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶LQ3XEOLF+HDOWK 
 
Tamara K Hervey, School of Law, University of Sheffield* 
 
t.hervey@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
 
%URZQVZRUGHWDO¶VFRQFHSWRIVWHZDUGVKLSUHOLHVRQWKHQRWLRQVRIµLQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHUV¶DQG
RIµSURGXFWLYHGLVFRQQHFWLRQ¶DQGµLQWHOOLJHQWSXUSRVLYHUHFRQQHFWLRQ¶EHWZHHQWKHZULWWHQ
texts of the law and developments in science, society and the interface between the two. This 
article DUJXHVWKDWµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶Dmodified version of stewardship applicable at the 
supranational level) provides an appropriate standpoint for analysis and assessment of the 
(8¶VODZDQGSROLF\PDNLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVLQWKHDUHDRISXEOLFKHDOWK. The article gives a 
preliminary illustration of KRZµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶PLJKWEHXVHGLQWKLVZD\ The overall 
argument is WKDWµLQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHUV¶GXO\PRGLILHGSURYLGHDGHYLFHIRUDQDO\VLVRU
DVVHVVPHQWRIODZDQGSROLF\PDNLQJDQGWKDWµSURGXFWLYHGLVFRQQHFWLRQ¶DQGµLQWHOOLJHQW
SXUSRVLYHUHFRQQHFWLRQ¶GXO\PRGLILHGSURYLGHDGHYLFHIRUDQDO\VLVRUDVVHVVPHQWRI
adjudication E\WKH(8¶V&RXUWRI-XVWLFH. 
 
Introduction: (Super)-stewardship, public health and the European Union 
 
µ(XURSHDQ&RXUWEDFNVEDQRQ5HG%XOORYHUKHDOWKFRQFHUQV¶ (7 February 2004) 
µ(8DOFRKROUXOLQJFKHHUVWUDGHUV¶1RYHPEHU 
µ(XURSHDQ&RXUWVODPV6ZHGHQ¶VDOFRKROLPSRUWEDQ¶-XQH 
µ6FRWFKWUDGHERG\VD\VPLQLPXPDOFRKROSULFLQJEUHDFKHV(8ODZ¶0DUFK 
µ(XURSHDQ&RXUWUXOHVPLQLPXPFLJDUHWWHSULFHVLOOHJDO¶0DUFK 
µ)RRGLQGXVWU\ZLQVEDWWOHRQ³WUDIILFOLJKW´ODEHOV-XQH 
 
Practitioners and academics within the health community have routinely been critical of 
involvement of the European 8QLRQDQGLWV&RXUWRI-XVWLFHµWKH&RXUW¶LQSROLF\DUHDV
concerning healthcare systems and public health, such as caffeine and vitamin-enhanced 
foodstuffs, alcohol and tobacco, as the quotations above, taken from the press,1 illustrate. The 
critique adYDQFHGLVRIWHQUDWKHUXQVSHFLILHGWRWKHJHQHUDOHIIHFWWKDWWKH(8¶VLQVWLWXWLRQV
should not be making such decisions, because the EU is about free trade rather than public 
health.2  
                                                 
*
 I am grateful to the participants at the UACES-sponsored Symposium with Professor Roger Brownsword, 
Super-stewardship in the Context of Public Health, Saturday 14 November 2009, School of Law, University of 
Sheffield; for the support of the ESRC Seminar Series European Law and New Health Technologies (PI Dr 
Mark Flear) REF: RES-451-26-0764 and of the University of Sheffield CILASS SURE Summer Intern Scheme 
2009; and for the comments of the anonymous reviewer. 
1
 The Independent, 7 February 2004, http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-
news/european-court-backs-ban-on-red-bull-over-health-concerns-569117.html; BBC News 23 November 2006 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6175646.stm; 7KH/RFDO6ZHGHQ¶V1HZVLQ(QJOLVK 5 June 2007 
http://www.thelocal.se/7508/20070605/; Beveridge Daily 9 March 2010 
http://www.beveragedaily.com/Regulation-Safety/Scotch-trade-body-says-minimum-alcohol-pricing-breaches-
EU-law5:DWVRQµ(XURSHDQFRXUWUXOHVPLQLPXPFLJDUHWWHSULFHVLOOHJDO¶%0-2010; 340:c1498 
http://www.bmj.com/content/340/bmj.c1498; EurActiv.com http://www.euractiv.com/en/food/food-industry-
wins-battle-traffic-light-labels-news-495324  (all accessed Jan 2011). 
2
 See, e.g., the consultation amonJNH\VWDNHKROGHUVUHSRUWHGLQ%%DXPEHUJDQG3$QGHUVRQµ+HDOWKDOFRKRO
DQG(8ODZXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHLPSDFWRI(XURSHDQVLQJOHPDUNHWODZRQDOFRKROSROLFLHV¶European Journal 
of Public Health (2008) 392-398; G Hermans, A F Casparie and J H Paelinck, eds, Health care in Europe after 
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But the relationships between the interests of free trade and those of public health protection 
or promotion are such that a balancing exercise between these interests must be carried out 
through law and policy making process, and, where disputes arise, through adjudication. 
Where states have chosen to become members of an international organization based on free 
trade, such as the European Union or the World Trade Organization, that balancing exercise 
must take place within the rules of such an organization. In the case of the EU, the direct 
effect3 and supremacy4 of EU law, and the role of the Court in interpreting EU law, as set out 
in the EU Treaties,5 mean perforce that the balancing exercise will sometimes be carried out 
by the Court. Furthermore, it is not clear that the Court invariably prefers free trade to public 
health ± both the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) itself6 and the 
&RXUW¶VMXULVSUXGHQFH7 recognize the need to protect values other than free trade within the 
FRQWH[WRIWKH(8¶VLQWHUQDOPDUNHWODZ 
 
Therefore, if we seek to assess whether the EU and its Court appropriately consider and 
weigh public health concerns in their decision-making processes, we need a more developed 
analytical standpoint from which to do so. The purpose of this article is to consider the extent 
tRZKLFK%URZQVZRUG¶VQRWLRQRIstewardship, the subject of this special issue, provides such 
an analytical standpoint. 
 
To this end, the article proceeds as follows. This introduction briefly outlines the concepts of 
stewardship and public health and the interface between them in the context of the EU. The 
article is organised into six potential objections to using the concept of stewardship to analyse 
EU institutional decision-making on public health. The first main section of the article 
considers the first of two overlapping groups of such objections. This first group of 
objections arises from claims to the effect either that the EU is in relevant respects no 
different from a state, or that the EU is too different from a state, and so stewardship does not 
SURYLGHDQDSSURSULDWHPRGHOWRDVVHVVWKH(8¶VDFWLYLWLHV7RZKDWH[WHQWFDQRQHNH\
DQDO\WLFDOFRQVWUXFWRIVWHZDUGVKLSLQWKHFRQWH[WRISXEOLFKHDOWKWKDWLV%URZQVZRUGHWDO¶V
                                                                                                                                                        
1992 /HLGHQ'DUWPRXWK00F.HH(0RVVLDORVDQG3%HOFKHUµ7KHLQIOXHQFHRI(XURSHDQ8QLRQODZ
RQQDWLRQDOKHDOWKSROLF\¶Journal of European Social Policy (1996) 263-86; M McKee, E Mossialos and R 
%DHWHQµ7KH,PSOLFDWLRQVRI(XURSHDQ/DZIRU+HDOWK&DUH¶LQ00F.HH(0RVVLDORVDQG5%DHWHQHGVThe 
Impact of EU Law on Health Care Systems (Brussels: PIE-Pieter Lang, 2002); A Gilmore and M McKee, 
µ7REDFFRSROLF\LQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶LQ($)HOGPDQDQG5%D\er, eds, Unfiltered: Conflicts over tobacco 
policy and public health &DPEULGJH0$+DUYDUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV9+DW]RSRXORVµ+HDOWK/DZDQG
3ROLF\WKHLPSDFWRIWKH(8¶LQ*GH%~UFDHGEU Law and the Welfare State: in search of solidarity (Oxford: 
283'60DUWLQVHQµ7RZDUGVDQLQWHUQDOKHDOWKPDUNHWZLWKWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUW¶West European 
Politics (2005) 1035-&1HZGLFNµ&LWL]HQVKLSIUHHPRYHPHQWDQGKHDOWKFDUHFHPHQWLQJLQGLYLGXDOULJKWV
E\FRUURGLQJVRFLDOVROLGDULW\¶Common Market Law Review (2006) 1645-68; S Greer, The Politics of 
European Union Health Policies (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2009). 
3
 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. 
4
 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
5
 Article 267 TFEU. 
6
 Articles 36, 45 (3), 52 (1), 106 TFEU. 
7
 See, e.g., Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649; 
Case 178/84 Commission v Germany (Beer Purity Laws) [1987] ECR 1227; Case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer 
[1991] ECR I-4221; Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1996] ECR I-4165; Case C-237/94 2¶)O\QQY$GMXGLFDWLRQ2IILFHU 
[1996] ECR I -2617. )RUIXUWKHUGLVFXVVLRQVHH-6FRWWµ0DQGDWRU\RU,PSHUDWLYH5HTXLUHPHQWVLQWKH(8DQG
WKH:72¶LQ&%DUQDUGDQG-6FRWWeds, The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises 
(Oxford: Hart, 2002), p 269-93; C Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (Oxford: OUP, 
2010) p 165-187, 241-2, 510-9+DW]RSRORXVµ5HFHQW'HYHORSPHQWVRIWKHFDVHODZRIWKH(&-LQWKHILHld of 
VHUYLFHV¶&0/5HY-'&KDOPHUVµ7KH6LQJOH0DUNHW)URP3ULPD'RQQDWR-RXUQH\PDQ¶LQ-
Shaw and G More, eds, New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Oxford: OUP, 1995). 
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µLQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHU¶8 be used to assess whether tKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶VSXEOLFKHDOWKSROLFLHV
LQJHQHUDODUHMXVWLILHG":KDWPRGLILFDWLRQVWR%URZQVZRUGHWDO¶VFRQFHSWDUHUHTXLUHG" 
 
The focus then turns to the Court. The second main section of the article focuses upon a 
group of objections to using the concept of stewardship to analyse the jurisprudence of the 
Court on public health. It considers whether stewardship can be applicable to the Court, as a 
VXSUDQDWLRQDOFRXUWZLWKLQDSDUWLFXODUµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHG¶OHJDORUGHUWKDWSUHGRPLQDQWO\
values tKHOLEHUWLHVLQKHUHQWLQWKHQRWLRQRIWKH(8¶VLQWHUQDOPDUNHW7RZKDWH[WHQWFDQD
second key analytical construct of stewardship in the context of public health, that is, 
%URZQVZRUG¶VQRWLRQVRIµSURGXFWLYHGLVFRQQHFWLRQ¶DQGµLQWHOOLJHQWSXUSRVLYHUHFRQQHFWLRQ¶
EHXVHGWRDVVHVVZKHWKHUWKH&RXUW¶VSXEOLFKHDOWKGHFLVLRQVDUHMXVWLILHG":KDW
PRGLILFDWLRQVWR%URZQVZRUG¶VFRQFHSWVDUHUHTXLUHG" 
 
The two clusters of concerns overlap because the claims about the nature of the Court as a 
µconstitutionalised¶ court go to the question of what kind of order or organisation the EU 
constitutes. The article concludes that no concern discussed MXVWLILHVUHMHFWLQJµVXSHU-
VWHZDUGVKLS¶DPRGLILHGYHUVLRQRIVWHZDUGVKLSDVDYDOXDEOHanalytical standpoint by which 
to assess the (8¶VGHFLVLRQVLQSXEOLFKHDOWKILHOGV. 7KHYDOXHRIµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶DQGLQ
SDUWLFXODUWKHQRWLRQVRIERWKµODGGHUVRILQWHUYHQWLRQ¶DQGµSURGXFWLYHGLVFRQQHFWLRQ¶DQG
µLQWHOOLJHQWSXUSRVLYHUHFRQQHFWLRQ¶EHWZHHQWKHZULWWHQWH[WVRIWKe law and developments in 
science, society and the interface between the two, is briefly illustrated throughout the article 
by reference to EU law concerning threats to public health arising from alcohol, tobacco, 
foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, blood and human tissues. 
 
6WHZDUGVKLSDFFRUGLQJWR%DOGZLQ%URZQVZRUGDQG6FKPLGW¶VVXPPDU\9 of the notion as 
developed in the Nuffield Report on Public Health: Ethical Issues,10 can be characterized as 
follows: 
µ/LEHUDOVWDWHVKDYHUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVWRORRNDIWHUimportant needs of people both individually 
and collectively. Therefore, states are stewards both to individual people, taking account of 
different needs arising from factors such as age, gender, ethnic background or socio-economic 
status, and to the populDWLRQDVDZKROH«>7@KHQRWLRQRIVWHZDUGVKLSJLYHVH[SUHVVLRQWR
the obligation on states to seek to provide conditions that allow people to be healthy, focusing 
DWWHQWLRQLQSDUWLFXODURQUHGXFLQJKHDOWKLQHTXDOLWLHV¶11 
This conception echoes the WorOG+HDOWK2UJDQLVDWLRQ¶VWorld Health Report, 2000, which 
FRQVLGHUVWKDWVWHZDUGVKLSFRQVLVWVLQWKHµXOWLPDWHUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶RIJRYHUQPHQWVIRUKHDOWK
within a state.12 %URZQVZRUGHWDO¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIVWHZDUGVKLSOLHVVRPHZKHUHEHWZHHQ
µOLEHUWDULDQSDWHUQDOLVP¶DQGSDWHUQDOLVP13 Their development of stewardship arises from 
WKHLUFRQYLFWLRQWKDWERWKSDWHUQDOLVPDQGµOLEHUWDULDQSDWHUQDOLVP¶DUHLQDSSURSULDWHRU
problematic models for public health policies. Paternalism as a model for public health 
policieVLVLQVXIILFLHQWO\UHVSHFWIXORILQGLYLGXDODXWRQRP\DQGFKRLFHµ/LEHUWDULDQ
SDWHUQDOLVP¶DOORZVWRRPXFKLQGLYLGXDOFKRLFHDQGWKXVDEVROYHVWKHVWDWHIURPLPSRUWDQW
responsibilities,14 especially to those who would otherwise be disproportionately 
                                                 
8
 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Public Health: ethical issues (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007) 
µ1XIILHOG5HSRUW¶S 
9
 ,Q7%DOGZLQ5%URZQVZRUGDQG+6FKPLGWµ6WHZDUGVKLS3DWHUQDOLVPDQG3XEOLF+HDOWK)XUWKHU7KRXJKWV¶
2 (1) Public Health Ethics (2009) 113-119. 
10
 London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007. 
11
 Baldwin et al, supra n 9, p 115-116; Nuffield Report, supra n 8, p 25. 
12
 WHO, World Health Report 2000, (Geneva, WHO, 2000), p xiv, 119-140.  
13
 Nuffield Report, supra n 8, p 17-25. 
14
 Nuffield Report, supra n 8, p 25. 
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disadvantaged in health terms by their age, gender, ethnic background or socio-economic 
status.  Stewardship is thus based on equality and proportionality, where policy goals impinge 
on individual preferences or even individual rights. Stewardship is also based on transparency 
and participation, not simply representative models of democratic process. It is based on 
oversight and trusteeship; on governments working in partnership with individuals.15  
 
For the purposes of this articleE\µSXEOLFKHDOWKSROLFLHV¶I mean collective or public 
DFWLYLWLHVUHJXODWLRQJRYHUQDQFHDQGµVWHHULQJ¶DLPHGDWWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHKHDOWKRIWKH
population; and the promotion of good health and the prevention of ill-health among the 
population.16 So defined, public health policy is a matter of shared competence between the 
EU and its Member States, with the EU having some regulatory power, and also power to 
support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States.17  The Member States, 
and in practice the EU,18 also share this responsibility with international organisations, in 
particular the World Health Organisation.19  EU public health policy is formally based on 
Article 168 TFEU. ,QJHQHUDOWKH(8¶VFRPSHWHQFHVLQSXEOLFKHDOWKDVGHILQHGLQ$UWLFOH
168 TFEU, are to support and complement those of the Member States. The EU has explicit 
legislative competence only in setting standards of organ and human tissue safety, veterinary 
and phytosanitary measures, and standards of safety for pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices.20 
 
Is µVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶DXVHIXODQDO\WLFDOVWDQGSRLQWIURPZKLFKWRDVVHVVWKH(8¶V
institutional decision making in public health law and policy? The article first considers this 
question in general, before turning in a later section to a specific focus on the Court. 
 
µ6XSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶DQG(8SXEOLFKHDOWKODZDQGSROLF\LQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHUV 
 
:LWKLQWKHLUVWHZDUGVKLSPRGHO%URZQVZRUGHWDO¶VµLQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHU¶21 provides a tool to 
consider and justify a range of different policy initiatives. The KLJKHUWKHµUXQJ¶RQWKHODGGHU
the stronger WKHMXVWLILFDWLRQPXVWEH7KHODGGHULVDVIROORZVKLJKHVWµUXQJ¶ILUVW 
x Eliminate choice 
x Restrict choice 
                                                 
15
 WHO, supra n 12, p 119. 
16
 L O Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duties and Restraints (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2000); R Martyn and L Johnson, eds, Law and the Public Dimension of Health (London: 
Cavendish, 2001). 
17
 Article 5 TEU; Articles 2 and 4 (2) (k) TFEU 9 IRUµFRPPRQVDIHW\FRQFHUQVLQSXEOLFKHDOWKPDWWHUV¶DV
GHILQHGLQ$UWLFOH7)(8$UWLFOHD7)(8IRUµSURWHFWLRQDQGLPSURYHPHQWRIKXPDQKHDOWK¶. 
18
 00F.HH7+HUYH\$*LOPRUHµ3XEOLFKHDOWKSROLFLHV¶LQ(0RVVLDORV*3HUPDQDQG5%DHWHQ7+HUYH\
eds, Health Systems Governance in Europe: the role of EU law and policy (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), p 231-81. 
19
 Cooperation between the EU and the WHO was originally based on an exchange of letters between EU 
Commissioner David Byrne and WHO Director-General Gro Bundtland in 2000. High and medium level 
meetings take place relatively regularly, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/eu_world/international_organisations/who/index_en.htm. Collaborative initiatives 
include, for instance, the Global Health Security Initiative, launched 2001 http://www.ghsi.ca/english/index.asp; 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 2003, of which the EU is a signatory; see A Gilmore and J 
&ROOLQµ7KHZRUOG¶VILUVWPDMRULQWHUQDWLRQDOWREDFFRFRQWURO7UHDW\¶British Medical Journal 19 Oct 2002, 
846-7; the Framework for Alcohol Policy in the WHO European Region 2006 
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/79396/E88335.pdf; and work on pandemic influenza 
preparedness http://apps.who.int/gb/pip/VHH0)OHDUµ5HILQLQJ(8SUHSDUHGQHVVWKURXJKVXSUD-stewardship¶ in 
this issue. The EU also works with the OECD and the Council of Europe on a range of health issues, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/eu_world/international_organisations/index_en.htm (accessed Jan 2011).  
20
 Article 168 (4) (a) (b) (c) TFEU. 
21
 Nuffield Report, supra n 8, p 42. 
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x Guide choice through disincentives 
x Guide choices through incentives 
x Guide choices through changing the default policy 
x Enable choice 
x Provide information 
x Do nothing or simply monitor the current situation 
To what extent might this analytical construct provide a means to assess EU public health law 
and policy? How might it need to be adjusted? 
Objection 1: Stewardship responsibilities apply to the EU. There is no need to develop an 
LGHDRIµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶ZKHQDVVHVVLQJWKH(8¶VSXEOLFKHDOWKSROLFLHV 
 
There are those ± notably Giandomenico Majone ± who have argued that the EU is already 
sufficiently µVWDWHOLNH¶WKDWZHPLJKWVD\WKDWLWKDVµVWHZDUGVKLS¶UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVtout court. 
InGHHG%URZQVZRUGGHVFULEHVWKHµstewardship jurisdiction¶ DVSHUWDLQLQJWRµWKHUHJXODWRU\
VWDWH¶22 DQG0DMRQHIRULQVWDQFHKDVGHVFULEHGWKH(8DVµDUHJXODWRU\VWDWH¶23 If the EU is 
a regulatory state, for the purposes of public health regulation, then the notion of stewardship, 
as developed for states, can be applied to the EU, without any need to develop it further. 
 
Moreover, even if we consider that the EU is insXIILFLHQWO\µVWDWH-OLNH¶WRFRXQWDVDµVWDWH¶
we might observe that the function of stewardship is essentially to mediate between different 
views about the balances between rights, freedoms and regulation in a particular society ± in 
other words, to manage pluralist societies. If we take that functional approach to stewardship, 
then we can say that the EU embodies a pluralist society or group of societies and so again 
µVWHZDUGVKLS¶per se is perfectly acceptable as an analytical or normative tool to assess EU 
public health policy. Again, there is no need for a special version of stewardship ± µVXSHU-
VWHZDUGVKLS¶± for assessing EU activity. 
 
Objection 2 is the polar opposite of the first objection: Stewardship is the responsibility of 
states, not of supranational organizations such as the EU.  
 
The concept of stewardship implies processes that legitimate public action.24 For 
Brownsword et al, and for the WHO,25 these legitimating processes are implicitly based upon 
a unitary community (the state). The failure to adopt the Constitutional Treaty, and the 
provisions of the post-Lisbon Treaty settlement, underline that the European Union is a 
µSURFHVVRIFUHDWLQJDQHYHUFORVHUXQLRQDPRQJWKHSHRSOHVRI(XURSH¶LQZKLFKWKH0HPEHU
                                                 
22
 R Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (Oxford, OUP, 2008), p 302. 
23
 *0DMRQHµ7KH5LVHRIWKH5HJXODWRU\6WDWHLQ(XURSH¶West European Politics 77-101; G Majone, 
µ$(XURSHDQ5HJXODWRU\6WDWH"¶LQ-5LFKDUGVRn, ed, European Union: Power and policy-making (London: 
Routledge, 1996); G Majone, Deregulation or Reregulation? Regulatory Reform in Europe and the United 
States /RQGRQ3LQWHU0RUHUHFHQWO\0DMRQH¶VZRUNKDVEHHQLQVSLUHGE\HFRQRPLFµFOXEWKHRU\¶
which emphasizes pluralism, although this does not necessarily exclude the idea of the regulatory state as 
defined by Majone. See G Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of 
Integration by Stealth (Oxford: OUP, 1995); *0DMRQHµ8QLW\LQ'LYHUVLW\(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQDQGWKH
HQODUJHPHQWSURFHVV¶(/5HY-481. For another perspective on the EU as (potentially) a state, see 
*0DQFLQLµ(XURSH7KH&DVHIRU6WDWHKRRG¶(/--42. 
24
 Nuffield Report, p 23, 26, 43-45, 46. The idea is also implicit in R Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the 
Technological Revolution (Oxford, OUP, 2008).  
25
 WHO, supra n 8. 
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States give competence, in the Treaties, to attain common objectives, but is not a state.26 Is 
stewardship as a concept so state-based that we could not meaningfully talk about the EU 
being subject even to a modified version of stewardship ± µVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶" 
 
In response to this objection, we might first observe that, for the purposes of legitimation of 
public action, it does not matter so much whether the relevant community is a state, or 
whether it is unitary (and we might argue about whether states can really be described as 
sovereign µXQLWDU\FRPPXQLWLHV¶27); what matters more is that it functions as a community. 
The essential basis of stewardship is both the value of community and the values of a 
community. So far, so good. %XWLIZHWUDQVODWHWKLVLQWRµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶DW(8OHYHO
which community do we mean? Or do we mean communities? Even the post-Lisbon version 
RIWKH(8¶VWUHDWLHVWDONVRIWKHµSHRSOHV¶RI(XURSH28 A small number of writers think there 
LVDµFRPPXQLW\¶RI(XURSHDQVRIZKLFKWKH(8LVDQLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDQG
which (might) OHJLWLPDWHWKH(8¶VQRUPDWLYHSRZHUV29 But many more are sceptical about 
such claims, pointing out that they are more aspirational discourse than reflecting present 
understandings, and that the EU has neither an existing demos,30 nor even a telos or µend 
game¶ that is a unitary community,31 but is more about the process of managing communities 
within a pluralist regime of interacting legal (and political) systems. 
 
The objections to the effect that the EU is not sufficiently state-like to generate the kind of 
FRPPXQLW\OHJLWLPDF\LPSOLHGE\µVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶DUHPRUHGLIILFXOWWRGLVPLVVWKDQ
                                                 
26
 Article 1 TEU; see, e.g., the decision of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht 2 BvE 2/08 Gauweiler v 
Treaty of Lisbon, 30 June 2009; see also the decision of the Polish Constitutional Court Polish Membership of 
the European Union K18/04 May 2005; Brunner v The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. See, eg, J 
)LVFKHUµ)URP&RQIHGHUDF\WR)HGHUDWLRQ7KRXJKWVRQWKH)LQDOLW\RI(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ¶
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/00/joschka_fischer_en.rtf (accessed Jan 2011); the discussion of 
the Constitutional Treaty and its rejection in P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform 
(Oxford: OUP, 2010) p 6-WKHFRQYHUVDWLRQEHWZHHQ/6LHGHQWRSµ$&ULVLVRI/HJLWLPDF\¶DQG$0RUDYFVLN
µ(XURSHZLWKRXW,OOXVLRQVDFDWHJRU\HUURU¶DW
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2005/07/europewithoutillusions/ (accessed Jan 2011).  
27
 See, eg N MacCormick, µBeyond the Sovereign State¶Modern Law Review (1993) 1-18; N MacCormick, 
Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford: OUP, 1999); N 
Walker, µ%H\RQGERXQGDU\GLVSXWHVDQGEDVLFJULGV0DSSLQJWKHJOREDOGLVRUGHURIQRUPDWLYHRUGHUV¶
International Journal of Constitutional Law (2008) 373-96. 
28
 Preamble, recital 6 TEU; Article 1(2) TEU. 
29
 The best-known of these is -+DEHUPDVµ:K\(XURSHQHHGVDFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶1HZ/HIW5HYLHZ
http://www.newleftreview.org/A2343 (accessed Jan 2011). 6HHDOVR-+DEHUPDVDQG-'HUULGDµ)HEUXDU\RI
:KDW%LQGV(XURSHDQV7RJHWKHU¶LQ'/HY\HWDOOld Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic 
Relations after the Iraq War (London: Verso, 2005), cited in D Chalmers et al European Union Law 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2010), p 6-)RUDGHIHQFHRIDPRUHPRGHVWYHUVLRQRIµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSDWULRWLVP¶IRUWKH
EU, which however recognises the EU as having multiple demoi, see, J-:0OOHUµ$(XURSHDQ&RQVWLWXtional 
3DWULRWLVP"7KH&DVH5HVWDWHG¶(/--557. 
30
 J Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1999); W Van Gerven, The European Union: A 
Polity of States and Peoples 2[IRUG+DUW-:HLOHU8+DOWHUQDQG)0D\HUµ(XURSHDQ'Hmocracy and 
LWV&ULWLTXH¶LQ-+D\ZDUGHGThe Crisis of Representation in Europe (Frank Cass, 1995) and (1995) 18 West 
European Politics 4±393&UDLJµ7KH1DWXUHRIWKH&RPPXQLW\,QWHJUDWLRQ'HPRFUDF\DQG/HJLWLPDF\¶LQ3
Craig and G de Búrca, eds, The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: OUP, 1999); K-+/DGHXUµ³:HWKH(XURSHDQ
3HRSOH«´± 5HOkFKH"¶(/--67.  
31
 See, eg, C. Joerges, Y. Mény and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.) What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? 
Responses to Joschka Fischer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, 2000), also available at 
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/00/symp.html (accessed Jan 2011), especially T Börzel and T 
5LVVHµ:KRLVAfraid of a European Federation? How to Constitutionalize a Multi-OHYHO*RYHUQDQFH6\VWHP¶
DQG-=LHORQNDµ(QODUJHPHQWDQGWKH)LQDOLW\RI(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ¶WKHUHLQ6HHDOVR-0RQQHWMemoires, 
(London: Doubleday, 1978), p 522-3, cited in I Ward, A Critical Introduction to European Law (Oxford: OUP, 
2009), p 211-2.  
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those that claim that stewardship tout court is adequate. There is a lot to be said for the view 
that the EU lacks a unitary demos, or telos involving a community in the singular.  However, 
RQHZD\WRMXVWLI\WKHGHYHORSPHQWRIµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶DVDVWDQGDUGDJDLQVWZKLFKWR
assess the EU might be to consider the EU as process, perhaps even constitutional, or 
constitutionalising, process.32 The process of either constituting a community and/or 
mediating between communities (or perhaps just very simply, community as communication 
within a (constitutionalising) process) could be cODLPHGWREHDVXIILFLHQWEDVLVIRUµVXSHU-
VWHZDUGVKLS¶REOLJDWLRQVZLWKLQDQDQDO\WLFDOIUDPHIRUDVVHVVLQJ(8SXEOLFKHDOWKSROLF\
We could then say that, in spite of the no demos/no community/no legitimacy arguments, 
there is sufficient community legitimacy ± as process ± within the EU context to support the 
application of a modified version of stewardship ± µVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶± to the EU. The 
disconnection EHWZHHQµFRPPXQLW\¶LQWKHVHQVHLWLVDSSOLHGWRDVWDWHDQGµFRPPXQLW\¶LQ
this process-based sense, as applied to the EU, requires and justifies the modification of 
VWHZDUGVKLSLQWRµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶ 
 
Add to this observation the fact that, although responsibility for public health policy is shared 
EHWZHHQWKH(8DQGLWV0HPEHU6WDWHVWKH(8¶s legislative powers in this respect are narrow. 
This narrow range of legislative competence means that we cannot simply transfer the model 
of stewardship onto the EU institutions, because they do not have sufficient power to fulfil 
stewardship obligations in the way that states do. However, neither can we say that the EU ± 
when it exercises its public health competences ± escapes the responsibilities encapsulated in 
the stewardship concept. A modified model ± µVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶± encapsulates the nature 
of the duties on the EU institutions in the context of public health policy. The (admittedly 
FDWFK\WHUPµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶FDSWXUHVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQWKH(8DQGLWV0HPEHU
States, echoing terms already used to describe that relationship and the E8¶VUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV
and competences within it, VXFKDVµVXSUDQDWLRQDO¶ 
 
6RIRULQVWDQFHZHFRXOGXVHWKHµODGGHURILQWHUYHQWLRQ¶WRDVVHVV WKH(8¶VGHFLVLRQV
restricting movements of cattle from the UK during the BSE/vCJD crisis during the late 
                                                 
32
 Much of the relevant literature on this subject pertains to the ill-fated Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe. See, eg, 3(OHIWKHULDGLVµConstitution or Treaty?¶7KH)ederal Trust Online Paper 12/04 1-12; J 
6KDZµ(XURSH¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQDO)XWXUH¶Public Law 132-51; 3(OHIWKHULDGLVµThe Idea of a European 
Constitution¶Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1-21; -6QHOOµ³(XURSHDQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
VHWWOHPHQW´, and ever-FORVHUXQLRQDQGWKH7UHDW\RI/LVERQGHPRFUDF\RUUHOHYDQFH"¶European Law 
Review (2008) 619-42. However, it also has a much longer pedigree, and involves more general reflection on 
EU constitutionalisation: see, eg(6WHLQµ/DZ\HUV-XGJHVDQGWKH0DNLQJRID7UDQVQDWLRQDO&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶
$PHULFDQ-RXUQDORI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ*%HUPDQQµ7KH6LQJOH(XURSHDQ$FW$1HZ&RQVWLWXWLRQ
IRUWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\"¶Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1989) 529-87-:HLOHUµ7KH
7UDQVIRUPDWLRQRI(XURSH¶Yale Law Journal '&XUWLQµ7KH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO6WUXFWXUHRIWKH
8QLRQ$(XURSHRI%LWVDQG3LHFHV¶Common Market Law Review (1993) 17-69; 3(OHIWKHULDGLVµ$VSHFWVRI
European ConstLWXWLRQDOLVP¶European Law Review (1996) 32-1:DONHUµ(XURSHDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP
DQG(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ¶Public Law 266-90; -6KDZµ3RVWQDWLRQDO&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPLQWKH(XURSHDQ
8QLRQ¶Journal of European Public Policy (1999) 579-97; J-C 3LULVµDoes the European Union have a 
Constitution? Does it need One?¶ (1999) 24 ELRev 557-85; -6KDZµ3URFHVVDQG&RQVWLWXWLRQDO'LVFRXUVHLQ
WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶Journal of Law and Society (2000) 4-37; 3&UDLJµ&RQVWLWXWLRQV&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPDQG
WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶European Law Journal (2001) 125-&7LPPHUPDQVµThe Constitutionalization of the 
(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶ (2002) 21 Yearbook of European Law 1-11; J Weiler and M Wind, eds, European 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge: CUP, 2003); -6KDZµ3URFHVV5HVSRQVLELOLW\DQG,QFOXVLRQLQ
(8&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶European Law Journal (2003) 45-9%UHGDµ$(XURSHDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQLQD
0XOWLQDWLRQDO(XURSHRUD0XOWLQDWLRQDO&RQVWLWXWLRQIRU(XURSH¶European Law Journal (2006) 33-44 
(drawLQJRQWKHZRUNRI-DPHV7XOO\&)6DEHODQG2*HUVWHQEHUJµConstitutionalising an Overlapping 
&RQVHQVXV7KH(&-DQGWKH(PHUJHQFHRID&RRUGLQDWH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO2UGHU¶16 European Law Journal 
(2010) 511-550. 
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1980s and 90s,33 or WKH(8¶VEORRG34 or organ and tissue donation35 law and policy. The fact 
that, at the height of the BSE/vCJD crisis, the EU had within its borders, on a scale at the 
time undetermined, a new, and fatal, human disease, the spread of which had not been 
contained, and about which consumers had been misinformed,36 justified interventions at the 
highest rung of the ladder ± sales of British beef products likely to carry the disease were 
prohibited. The Blood Safety Directive37 and Human Tissue and Organs Directives38 provide 
for accreditation, authorisation and licensing of establishments that collect human blood, 
organs or tissues, and establish inspection and quality control requirements with respect to 
those establishments.39 These provisions are designed to ensure traceability of human blood 
and tissue, to avoid a repetition of the public health scandals that surrounded donation of 
                                                 
33
 Eg Commission Decision 89/469/EEC OJ 1989 L 225/51; Decision 90/59/EEC OJ 1990 L 41/23; 
Commission Decision 94/474/EC OJ 1994 L 194/96; Commission Decision 96/239/EC OJ 1996 L 788/47 
issuing a complete ban on the dispatch of live cattle and all cattle products from the UK. 
34
 Directive 2002/98/EC setting standards of quality and safety for the collection, testing, processing, storage 
and distribution of human blood and blood components and amending Directive 2001/83/EC OJ 2003 L 33/30; 
Commission Communication on the application of Directive 2002/98/EC setting standards of quality and safety 
for the collection, testing, processing, storage and distribution of human blood and blood components and 
amending Directive 2001/83/EC COM (2010)03 final; Directive 2009/135/EC of 3 November 2009 allowing 
temporary derogations to certain eligibility criteria for whole blood and blood components donors laid down in 
Annex III to Directive 2004/33/EC in the context of a risk of shortage caused by the Influenza A(H1N1) 
pandemic OJ 2009 L 288/7; Commission Regulation 523/2008 of 11 June 2008 amending Annexes VIII, X and 
XI to Regulation (EC) No 1774/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the import of 
blood products for the manufacture of technical products OJ 2008 L 153/23; European Commission Report on 
the promotion by Member States of voluntary unpaid blood donations, COM (2006) 217 final; Commission 
Directive 2004/33/EC of 22 March 2004 implementing Directive 2002/98/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council as regards certain technical requirements for blood and blood components OJ 2004 L 91/25.  
35
 Directive 2010/45/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on standards of quality and safety of 
human organs intended for transplantation OJ 2010 L 207/14; European Parliament resolution of 22 April 2008 
on organ donation and transplantation: Policy actions at EU level (2007/2210 (INI)) OJ 2009 C 259/1; 
Regulation 1394/2007/EC on advanced therapy medicinal products OJ 2007 L 324/121; Directive 2004/23/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, 
procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells OJ 2004 L 
102/48, as amended; Commission Directive 2006/17/EC implementing Directive 2004/23/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards certain technical requirements for the donation, procurement and 
testing of human tissues and cells OJ 2006 L 38/40;  
36
 Infamously, the then incumbent UK Minister of Agriculture publicly tried to feed a beef burger to his 4 year 
old daughter on 16 May 1990. 
37
 Directive 2002/98/EC setting standards of quality and safety for the collection, testing, processing, storage 
and distribution of human blood and blood components and amending Directive 2001/83/EC OJ 2003 L 33/30. 
38
 Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on setting standards of quality and 
safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues 
and cells OJ 2004 L 102/48; Directive 2010/45/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on standards 
of quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation OJ 2010 L 207/14. 
39
 )RUGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH(8¶VUHJXODWLRQRIEORRGDQGKXPDQWLVVXHVHH6+HQQHWWH-9DXFKH]µ%LRPHGLFLQHDQG
(8ODZ8QOLNHO\(QFRXQWHUV"¶(8,:RUNLQJ3DSHUV56&$6http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/14174 
(accessed Jan 2011); A-0)DUUHOOµ7KH3ROLWLFVRI5LVNDQG(8*RYHUQDQFHRI+XPDQ0DWHULDO¶Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law (2009) 41-64; A-0)DUUHOOµ,VWKH*LIWVWLOO*RRG"([DPLQLQJWKH
Politics and Regulation of Blood Safety in the European Union 14 Medical Law Review (2006) 155-79; M 
)DYDOHDQG$3ORPHUµ)XQGDPHQWDO'LVMXQFWLRQVLQWKH(8/HJDO2UGHURQ+XPDQ7LVVXH&HOOVDQG$GYDQFHG
5HJHQHUDWLYH7KHUDSLHV¶Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2009) 89-111; T Hervey 
DQG+%ODFNµ7KH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDQGWKH*RYHUQDQFHRI6WHP&HOO5HVHDUFK¶Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law (2005) 3--0F+DOHµ1DQRPHGLFLQHDQGWKH(86RPH/HJDO(WKLFDODQG
5HJXODWRU\&KDOOHQJHV¶Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2009) 65-0)OHDUµ7KH
(8¶V%LRSROLWLFDO*RYHUQDQFHRI$GYDQFHG7KHUDS\0HGLFLQDO3URGXFWV¶Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law (2009) 113-137. 
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HIV-contaminated blood in the 1980s and 90s.40 Again the significant potential harm to 
individuals involved justifies an intervention at the highest rung of the ladder ± no one can 
procure or apply human blood or tissue in the EU without being accredited to do so. 
 
Equally, by contrast, ZHPLJKWFRQVLGHUWKDWWKH(8¶VIRRGODEHOOLQJUHJLPH41 with respect to 
foods that are harmful to human health, for instance, in that they encourage obesity, is 
insufficiently high up the intervention ladder, in that it only provides information,42 and 
indeed, that it does not require all necessary information for consumers to make informed 
choices.43  Given the inequalities inherent in obesity as a public health problem in European 
societies,44 interventions higher up the ladder, for instance, that guide choices towards 
healthier eating patterns, would be justifiHGXQGHUDµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶PRGHO 
 
Objection 3: But how do we assess whether the EU should be involved at all in blood or 
human tissue safety regulation? 
 
%URZQVZRUGHWDO¶VµLQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHU¶JLYHVQRSXUFKDVHZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKH
µEHVWOHYHO¶IRULQWHUYHQWLRQRUEHWWHUZLWKLQDPXOWL-level and process-based system, such as 
                                                 
40
 T Hervey and J McHale, Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), p 343-8; P J Hagen, 
Blood Transfusion in Europe: A White Paper 6WUDVERXUJ&RXQFLORI(XURSH3UHVV'*LHVHQµ/LDELOLW\
IRU7UDQVIHURI+,9,QIHFWHG%ORRGLQ&RPSDUDWLYH3HUVSHFWLYH¶Professional Negligence (1994) 2; Y 
Englert, ed, Organ and Tissue Transplantation in the European Union (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) A-
M Farrell (2006), supra n 39, p 157. 
41
 Directive 2000/13/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, 
presentation and advertising of foodstuffs OJ 2000 L 109/29, as amended; Directive 2009/39/EC on foodstuffs 
intended for particular nutritional uses OJ 2009 L 124/21; Regulation 834/2007/EC on organic production and 
labelling of organic products OJ 2007 L 189/1; Regulation 1924/2006/EC on nutrition and health claims made 
RQIRRGV2-/)RUGLVFXVVLRQVHH&0DF0DROiLQµ:DLWHU7KHUH¶VD%HHWOHLQP\6RXS<HV6LU
7KDW¶V('LVSDULWLHV%HWZHHQ$FWXDO,QGLYLGXDO%HKDYLRXUDQG5HJXODWLQJ)RRG Labelling for the Average 
&RQVXPHULQ(8/DZ¶Common Market Law Review (2008) 1147-65; H 8QEHUDWKDQG$-RKQVWRQµ7KH
Double-+HDGHG$SSURDFKRIWKH(&-&RQFHUQLQJ&RQVXPHU3URWHFWLRQ¶Common Market Law Review 
(2007) 1237-84; H-C con Heydebrand u.d. /DVDµ)UHH0RYHPHQWRI)RRGVWXIIs, consumer protection and food 
VWDQGDUGVLQWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\+DVWKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFH*RWLW:URQJ"¶European Law Review 
(1991) 391-415; S Weatherillµ5HFHQW&DVH/DZFRQFHUQLQJWKH)UHH0RYHPHQWRI*RRGV0DSSLQJWKH
)URQWLHUVRI0DUNHW'HUHJXODWLRQ¶&0/5HY2%URXZHUµ)UHH0RYHPHQWRI)RRGVWXIIVDQG
4XDOLW\5HTXLUHPHQWV+DVWKH&RPPLVVLRQ*RWLW:URQJ"¶Common Market Law Review (1988) 237-67. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 In spite of regular calls for its introduction from the public health community, the EU has not been able to 
introduce mandatory food labelling requirements that give information about the health-related qualities of 
foodstuff, such aVWKHYROXQWDU\µWUDIILFOLJKW¶IRRGODEHOOLQJV\VWHPDGRSWHGE\WKH8.)RRG6WDQGDUGV$JHQF\
see http://www.eatwell.gov.uk/foodlabels/trafficlights/#cat334844 (accessed JDQ6HH µ7UDIILF OLJKW IRRG
ODEHOOLQJ D SRVLWLRQ VWDWHPHQW¶ 8. )DFXOW\ RI 3XEOLF +HDOWK
http://www.fph.org.uk/uploads/ps_food_labelling.pdf (accessed Jan 2011); House of Commons Health 
Committee Obesity Third Report of session 2003-04 London: Stationery Office, 2004; EurActiv.com 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/food/food-industry-wins-battle-traffic-light-labels-news-495324. The 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VProposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the provision of food 
information to consumers COM(2008) 40 final, does not include the requirement to give information about the 
health impact of food.  
44
 Obesity is linked to social class, see UK Office for National Statistics 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Product.asp?vlnk=11130&More=Y (accessed Jan 2011) and to 
SRYHUW\VHH-6REDODQG$-6WXQNDUGµ6RFLRHFRQRPLFVWDWXVDQGREHVLW\DUHYLHZRIWKHOLWHUDWXUH¶
Psychology Bulletin (1989) 260-$'UHZQRZVNLDQG6(6SHFWHUµ3RYHUW\DQG2EHVLW\WKHUROHRIHQHUJ\
density aQGHQHUJ\FRVWV¶American Journal of Clinical Nutrition (2004) 6-/0F/DUHQµ6RFLRHFRQRPLF
VWDWXVDQGREHVLW\¶Epidemiological Review (2007) 29-48. For further analysis of links between poverty, 
social exclusion and health, see Eurostat, Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion (Brussels: EUROSTAT, 
2010) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-EP-09-001/EN/KS-EP-09-001-EN.PDF  
(accessed Jan 2011). 
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the EU, the best combination of interventions, be they involving supra-national, national, or 
sub-national regulatory actors, or leaving matters to individual choice. In addition to the 
dimension of stewardship that concerns relationships between the individual and the state 
UHJXODWRUZKLFKLVGHDOWZLWKE\WKHµLQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHU¶RIIHUHGE\%URZQVZRUGDQGKLV
FROOHDJXHVµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶PXVWDOVRFRQFHUQLtself with WKHµEHVWFRPELQDWLRQRI
LQWHUYHQWLRQV¶ question.  
 
Most, if not all, public health problems involve, for instance, communicable diseases that 
cross jurisdictional boundaries, or activity based on large-scale communities, such as 
immunization, especially in the context of the abilities of human beings to move freely in an 
increasingly connected world. In a multi-level and process-based system, such as the EU, the 
TXHVWLRQLVQRWZKHUHZHVKRXOGSODFHWKHµHQWU\SRLQW¶RIDµEHVW-level interventioQODGGHU¶
Rather, it is ± to continue with the metaphor of ladders ± DERXWKRZPDQ\µUXQJV¶RQWKH
ladder of institutional interactions a policy process should involve. Should public health 
decisions be left only to individuals? Should policy be made through interactions involving 
actors at local and national levels? Or should policy decisions be taken involving interactions 
with other levels, such as the international (the WHO) or the EU?  
 
%URZQVZRUGHWDO¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHUIRUDVVHVVLQJWKHUHODWLRQship between individual and 
VWDWHUHJXODWRUKDVLQGLYLGXDODXWRQRP\DQGFKRLFHDVLWVµEDVHOLQH¶DQGWKHIXUWKHUIURPWKH
base a proposed intervention, the higher the justification involved.  What is the appropriate 
EDVHOLQHIRURXUµPXOWL-level ladder RILQWHUYHQWLRQ¶"2QHSRVVLEOHEDVHOLQHSURYLGHGZLWKLQ
EU law itself, is the doctrine of subsidiarity.45 That would also begin at the level of the 
individual, and involve requiring increasingly greater justification for any intervention with 
individual rights or freedoms that involves interactions with increasingly larger groups above 
that level. So, for instance, we might say that each local community should be empowered to 
define its public health policy, through interactions with individuals within that community. 
Policies formed through interactions between local and national-level institutions require 
greater justification.46 However, given the community-based nature of public health, there is 
DQDUJXPHQWWREHPDGHWKDWWKHVWDUWLQJSRLQWRQWKHµPXOWL-OHYHOLQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHU¶VKRXOG
be at national level. Indeed, it could equally be argued that, given the fact that public health 
problems do not stop at state boundaries, as indeed the existence of international 
organisations such as the World Health Organization attests, the starting point should be 
international level, and policy processes that fail to iQFOXGHWKLVµUXQJ¶RIWKHµPXOWL-level 
LQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHU¶VKRXOGMXVWLI\WKLVH[FOXVLRQ 
 
What matters for this article, however, is that whichever of these possible starting points were 
adopted, there would be a need to justify public health policy interventions involving EU (as 
opposed to national or international) actors. One possible approach to this justification would 
be to say that where the Member States of the EU share sufficient contours of a particular 
public health problem ± say, obesity ± which are not shared globally, that EU-level (as 
opposed to international or national) involvement is justified. Alternatively, where other EU 
ODZVRUSROLFLHVVXFKDVLQDJULFXOWXUHWKHHQYLURQPHQWRUWKH(8¶VLQWHUQDOPDUNHWKDYHDQ
EU-specific effect on public health, EU-level policy would also be justified.47  In other words, 
                                                 
45
 Article 5 (3) TEU. 
46
 )RULQVWDQFHWRZQVRUFLWLHVWKDWDUHµKRWVSRWV¶IRUFRPPXQLFDEOHGLVHDVHVVXFKDVVZLQHIOXshould be able 
to define their own swine flu policy, and national policy that harmonizes such policies must be justified. 
47
 This is also supported by the post-/LVERQµPDLQVWUHDPLQJ¶REOLJDWLRQZLWKUHVSHFWWRKXPDQKHDOWKVHH
Article 9 TFEU. 
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justification would be by reference to the need to protect the health of a community or group 
of communities beyond that of the nation state, but falling short of the global community.  
 
8QGHUµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶WKHµPXOWL-OHYHOODGGHURILQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ZRXOGEHDVIROORZV
KLJKHVWUXQJILUVW,QFOXVLRQRIRQHµUXQJ¶LPSOLHV a process of interactions between all the 
µUXQJV¶EHORZLW$JDLQWKHKLJKHUWKHµUXQJ¶WKHJUHDWHUWKHneed for justification. 
x Decide rules or policies involving institutions or actors at EU level 
x Decide rules or policies involving international level institutions (especially in this 
context, the WHO) 
x Decide rules or policies involving national level institutions and actors 
x Decide rules or policies involving sub-national institutions and actors 
x Individual decisions 
It is worth noting that the order of rungs on the best-level ladder appears to be counter-
intuitive, in that EU level policies require a greater justification than international policies. 
Indeed, where EU policy departs from rules or policies determined by interactions between 
actors on the other four rungs of the ladder (e.g. WHO guidance), the greatest justification is 
required. This is because of the nature of public health protection, as a global activity, and the 
commonality of disease to humanity, rather than regionally-based groups of human beings. If 
EU policy does not simply follow, e.g., WHO policy, this must be justified. The implication 
here is that the strongest justification must be advanced if EU-level institutions are to be 
involved in public health policy decisions. So, for instance, the development of the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, which seeks to coordinate responses to 
communicable diseases48 ZLWKLQWKH(8ZRXOGQHHGWREHMXVWLILHGE\UHIHUHQFHWRµVXSHU-
VWHZDUGVKLS¶,WLVQRWDWDOOFOHDUZKDWµDGGHGYDOXH¶WKH(&'&EULQJVWRWKHZRUNRIQDWLRQDO
disease control institutions and the work of WHO Europe.49 Equally, for instance, it is not 
FOHDUWKDWWKH(8¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQWKH swine flu epidemic in 2009 was justified. The public 
health threat was global, there was nothing in particular about the problem that mandated an 
EU response. On the other hand, for instance, the long-standing common agricultural 
policy,50 DVZHOODVWKH(8¶VLQWHUQDOPDUNHWLQJRRGVMXVWLILHVWKHHOHPHQWVRI(8-level food 
law and policy that protect and promote public health.51 
                                                 
48
 Such as SARS, avian flu, swine flu. 
49
 )RUGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH(&'&VHH6/*UHHUµThe European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control: Hub 
RUKROORZFRUH"¶DQG+(OOLRWW6/*UHHU'.-RQHVµ0DSSLQJ'LVHDVH&RQWUROLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶ERWK
forthcoming 2011 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law. 
50
 See, eg, M Cardwell, The European Model of Agriculture (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
51
 7KH(8¶VIRRGsafety law is based on the three stages of assessment, management and communication of risk. 
Formal audit procedures allow assessment of hazard analysis and critical control point mechanisms, which are 
self-regulatory controls operated at national levelZLWKRYHUVLJKWE\WKH(8¶V(XURSHDQ)RRG6DIHW\$XWKRULW\. 
The system aims to provide transparency and traceability. See Regulation 178/2002/EC laying down the general 
principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down 
procedures in matters of food safety OJ 2002 L 31/1, as amended; Conclusions of the Standing Committee on 
the Food Chain and Animal Health, Guidance on the Implementation of Articles 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of 
Regulation 178/2002 on General Food Law, approved 26 Jan 2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/foodlaw/guidance/docs/guidance_rev_8_en.pdf (accessed Jan 2011). See, eg, E 
Vos and F Wendler, eds, Food Safety Regulation in Europe (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2006); C Ansell and D Vogel, 
µ7KH&RQWHVWHG*RYHUQDQFHRI(8)RRG6DIHW\5HJXODWLRQ¶LQ&$QVHOODQG'9RJHOHGV:KDW¶VWKH%HHI"
The Contested Governance of European Food Safety (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 2006); R 2¶5RXUNH
European Food Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2005); D Holland and H Pope, EU Food Law and Policy 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004); E Vosµ(8)RRG6DIHW\5HJXODWLRQLQWKHDIWHUPDWKRIWKH%6(
FULVLV¶Journal of Consumer Policy (2000) 227; E Vos, Institutional Frameworks of Community Health and 
Safety Regulation (Oxford: Hart, 1999) . The EU also has a (voluminous) body of legislation on the content, 
Submitted to NILQ as part of special issue on Super-stewardship in public health 12 
 
 
The discussion so far has shown that a modified version of stewardship provides a valuable 
DQDO\WLFDOWRROWRDVVHVVWKH(8¶VSXEOLFKHDOWKODZDQGSROLF\ The shared competence for 
public health policy between the EU and its Member States justifies the application of 
%URZQVZRUG¶VµLQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHU¶LQWHUPVRIDVVHVVLQJWKHcontent RISROLF\µ6XSHU-
steZDUGVKLS¶± the obligations of stewardship translated to a supranational context ± requires 
the development of DVHFRQGµLQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHU¶ZKLFKLVFRQFHUQHGZLWKZKLFKlevels of 
intervention are appropriate for policy development and implementation. 
 
µ6XSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶DQGWKH&RXUWLQSXEOLFKHDOWK: productive disconnection and 
intelligent purposive reconnection 
 
The second main part of the article considers the extent to which the observations made so far 
± WKDWµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶SURYLGHVDFUHGLEOHDQDO\WLFDOVWDQGSRLQWWRDVVHVVWKHDFWLRQVRI
WKH(8¶V institutions ± apply to the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
 
2EMHFWLRQ6WHZDUGVKLSGRHVQ¶WLPSRVHREOLJDWLRQVRQFRXUWV 
 
$WILUVWJODQFHLQERWKWKH:+2:RUOG5HSRUWDQGLQ%URZQVZRUG¶VZRUNHVSHFLDOO\
in the Nuffield ReportVWHZDUGVKLSVHHPVWREHDERXWWKHVWDWH¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\DVregulator ± 
what seems to be intended is the responsibilities of legislatures and administrative authorities, 
and those bodies to whom they delegate legislative and administrative competence.52 
Moreover, public health (in common with some other fields such as the regulation of new 
technologies) seems to be a field where the legislature and executive both set and hold the 
regulatory position. It does not appear that courts are involved centrally in this process at all. 
Thus, stewardship does not at all seem to be about courts, still less the 
VXSUDQDWLRQDOµFRQVWLWXWLRQDO¶&RXUWRI-XVWLFHRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ 
 
%XWZHFDQGLVPLVVWKLVREMHFWLRQTXLWHTXLFNO\DVDOWKRXJKWKH:+2¶VDQGNuffield Report 
discussion of stewardship appears to be only about legislative or administrative activities, 
Brownsword himself deals (implicitly) with how stewardship obligations apply to courts at 
length in Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution.53 Given the lag or gaps 
between regulation and the development of new technologies; new knowledge and 
understanding of the world; and new social or cultural practices, courts have to deal with 
µUHJXODWRU\GLVFRQQHFWLRQ¶&RXUWVDFWLQJDVLQWHUSUHWHUVRIWKHODZKDYH what are essentially 
stewardship obligations to consider whether to adopt a creative approach to interpretation, 
DQGµUHFRQQHFW¶ODZWRGHYHORSPHQWVRUWRDGRSWDPRUHFRQVHUYDWLYHDSSURDFKLQRUGHUWR
SURPSWWKHOHJLVODWXUHWRILOOWKHµUHJXODWRU\YRLG¶WKDWZLOOEHFRPHDSSDUHQWE\OHDving the 
law and developments disconnected. Courts are required to act as stewards of the regulatory 
FRPSDFWE\GLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQµXQSURGXFWLYH¶DQGµSURGXFWLYHGLVFRQQHFWLRQ¶54 For 
                                                                                                                                                        
labelling and packaging of foodstuffs. This ranges from Directive 2000/36/EC relating to cocoa and chocolate 
SURGXFWVLQWHQGHGIRUKXPDQFRQVXPSWLRQ2-/ZKLFKUHSODFHVWKHµROGVW\OH¶&KRFRODWH'LUHFWLYH
73/241/EEC OJ 1973 L 228/23, to new Regulations on food flavourings (Regulation 1334/2008/EC, OJ 2008 L 
354/34); additives (Regulation 1333/2008/EC OJ 2008 L 354/16); and enzymes (Regulation 1332/2008/EC OJ 
2008 L 354/7), and includes Directive 2000/13/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs OJ 2000 L 109/29. 
52
 )RULQVWDQFH%DOGZLQHWDODVVHUWWKDWXQGHUDVWHZDUGVKLSPRGHOµSXEOLFKHDOWKSURJUDPPHVVKRXOG
«¶± in other words stewardship is a tool for assessing programmes, not adjudication. 
53
 R Brownsword, Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution (Oxford: OUP, 2008) (RRTR), Chapter 
µ7KH&KDOOHQJHRI5HJXODWRU\&RQQHFWLRQ¶ 
54
 Brownsword, RRTR, supra n 53 p 166-7; 184. 
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Brownsword,55 µSURGXFWLYHGLVFRQQHFWLRQ¶DULVHVZKHUHWKHUHLVDJHQXLQHTXHVWLRQDERXW
whether, and how, developments in science and society fit within the spirit and intent of the 
regulatory scheme. In those circumstances, courts act as stewards when they decline to use 
creative or purposive interpretation to solve a problem that really needs to be addressed 
through law and policy-making processes.56 µ5HFRQQHFWLRQ¶RIODZZLWKGHYHORSLQJVFLHQFH
LQVRFLHW\E\FRXUWVDGRSWLQJSXUSRVLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIOHJLVODWLYHWH[WVLVRQO\µLQWHOOLJHQW¶
RUµVPDUW¶LQ%URZQVZRUG¶VWHUPVLIWKHGLVFRQQHFWLRQLVPHUHO\µGHVFULSWLYH¶57 and 
µXQSURGXFWLYH¶58 Otherwise, courts should maintain the disconnections, as these will produce 
a realignment of the regulatory arrangements through legislative activity.59 Whether courts 
adopt a purposive approach depends upon how WKH\MXGJHWKHµUHJXODWRU\WLOW¶60 ± in other 
words the default position set by regulators.61 Courts have stewardship responsibilities to 
FRQVLGHUWKHLUUROHWKURXJKDYRLGLQJFUHDWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVWKDWµSDSHURYHUWKHFUDFNV¶LQ
re-opening debates that legitimate regulatory choices in pluralist societies. 
 
Now, when we think about this stewardship role of courts, and its relationship with the 
stewardship role of the legislature, in terms of the Court and the EU legislature, the first 
obvious difference between the EU and a state is that the EU legislature is hopelessly slow at 
responding to changing scientific knowledge and information, or cultural practices, because it 
is full of veto points (significantly more so than national legislatures).62 The EU legislative 
processes have been widely criticized as being insufficiently legitimate, including where the 
EU legislates in areas such as public health, where law interfaces with science and society.63 
These features of the EU legislative process might mean that we need a different calibration 
RIµSXUSRVLYHUHFRQQHFWLRQ¶IRUWKH&RXUW%URZQVZRUG¶VµSXUSRVLYHUHFRQQHFWLRQ¶LVEDVHG
upon an assumption that the legislature will intervene, within a reasonable timeframe, to fill 
the gap and reconnect the law and the new development. It also assumes that the legislative 
process is legitimate and appropriate. To make those assumptions in the context of EU 
legislation is problematic. For instance, we might point to the more than 10 years that it took 
the EU to agree the Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, and the 
significant discussion with respect to its legitimacy in doing so64 or the protracted, highly 
                                                 
55
 5HO\LQJRQ/RQ)XOOHU¶VZRUNHVSHFLDOO\/)XOOHUThe Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1969), p 209-/)XOOHUµ3RVLWLYLVPDQG)LGHOLW\WR/DZ± $5HSO\WR3URIHVVRU+DUW¶-58) 71 Harvard 
Law Review 630, cited in RRTR, p 161 and 167. 
56
 RRTR, supra n 53, p 167. 
57
 Where the descriptions in law or policy decisions no longer correspond to developments in science and/or 
society, RRTR, supra n 53, p 166. 
58
 Where developments in science and society are within the spirit and intent of law (or policy decisions), 
although not in the letter of the law, RRTR, supra n 53, p 167, see also p 183. 
59
 RRTR, supra n 53, p 184 
60
 RRTR, supra n 53, p 172-3 
61
 RRTR, supra n 53, p 21. See also R Thaler and C Sunstein, Nudge (London, Penguin, 2008) which makes 
much of the default position of regulatory arrangements. 
62
 G Tsebelis and X Yataganas, µVeto Players and Decision-making in the EU After Nice. Policy Stability and 
BXUHDXFUDWLF-XGLFLDO'LVFUHWLRQ¶Journal of Common Market Studies (2002) 283-307; F 6FKDUSIµThe Joint 
'HFLVLRQ7UDS/HVVRQVIURP*HUPDQ)HGHUDOLVPDQG(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ¶Public Administration (1988) 
239-278.  
63
 See, for instance, B Kohler-Koch and B Rittberger, eds, Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European 
Union (Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); Weiler, Haltern and Mayer, supra n 30; S Jasanoff, Designs 
on Nature. Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 
2005). 
64
 Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions OJ 1998 L 213/13. For discussion 
VHHHJ(&ORDWUHµ)URP,QWHUQDWLRQDO(WKLFVWR(XURSHDQ8QLRQ3ROLF\$FDVHVWXG\RQELRSLUDF\LQWKH(8¶V
%LRWHFKQRORJ\'LUHFWLYH¶Law and Policy (2006) 345-7+HUYH\DQG+%ODFNµ7KHEuropean Union and 
WKH*RYHUQDQFHRI6WHP&HOO5HVHDUFK¶Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2005) 11-
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contested (and ongoing65) legislative process concerning EU-level regulation of tobacco66 and 
its advertisement.67 Because of these features of the EU legislative processµVXSHU-
VWHZDUGVKLS¶± a version of µVWHZDUGVKLS¶DGMXVWHGfor the Court ± might involve a greater 
GHJUHHRIµXQSURGXFWLYHGLVFRQQHFWLRQ¶DQGWKXVDQHQKDQFHGUROHIRUMXGLFLal creativity. 
Whether we want to entrust the Court with this responsibility is a matter of disagreement.68 
%XWµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶DQGDQREOLJDWLRQWRFRQVLGHUDUHFDOLEUDWHGFKRLFHEHWZHHQ
                                                                                                                                                        
48, at 32-(5*ROGDQG$*DOORFKDWµ7KH(XURSHDQ%LRWHFK'LUHFWLYHSDVWDVSURORJXH¶European Law 
Journal (2001) 331-366; R Goldberg and J Lonbay, eds, Pharmaceutical Medicine, Biotechnology and 
European Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2000). 
65
 Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the structure and rates of excise duty applied to manufactured 
tobacco COM(2010) 641 final; Proposal for a Council Directive on the structure and rates of excise duty applied 
to manufactured tobacco COM(2007) 587 final. 
66
 Council Directive 2010/12/EU amending Directives 92/79/EEC, 92/80/EEC and 95/59/EC on the structure 
and rates of excise duty applied on manufactured tobacco and Directive 2008/118/EC OJ 2010 L 50/1; Council 
Decision 2004/513/EC concerning the conclusion of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control OJ 
2004 L 213/8; Commission Decision 2003/641/EC on the use of colour photographs or other illustrations as 
health warnings on tobacco packages OJ 2003 L 226/24; European Parliament and Council Directive 
2001/37/EC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products OJ 2001 L 194/26; Council Directive 
1999/81/EC of 29 July 1999 amending Directive 92/79/EEC on the approximation of taxes on cigarettes, 
Directive 92/80/EEC on the approximation of taxes on manufactured tobacco other than cigarettes and Directive 
95/59/EC on taxes other than turnover taxes which affect the consumption of manufactured tobacco OJ 1999 L 
219/47; Council Directive 92/80/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the approximation of taxes on manufactured 
tobacco other than cigarettes OJ 1992 L 316/10; Council Directive 92/78/EEC of 19 October 1992 amending 
Directives 72/464/EEC and 79/32/EEC on taxes other than turnover taxes which are levied on the consumption 
of manufactured tobacco OJ 1992 L 316/5; Council Directive 92/41/EEC of 15 May 1992 amending Directive 
89/622/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning the labelling of tobacco products OJ 1992 L 158/30. 
67
 Directive 2003/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003 on the approximation 
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the advertising and 
sponsorship of tobacco products OJ 2003 L 152/16; Directive 98/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 6 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
Member States relating to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products OJ 1998 L 213/9; Directive 
2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of 
audiovisual media services OJ 2010 L 95/1, Articles 9 (d), 10 (2) and 11 (4); Directive 2007/65/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the 
coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities OJ L 2007 332/27, Articles 3e (d), 3f (2) and 3g (3); 
Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social 
Committee - Report on the implementation of the tobacco advertising directive (2003/33/EC) COM(2008) 330 
ILQDO)RUGLVFXVVLRQVHH00F.HH7+HUYH\DQG$*LOPRUHµ3XEOLF+HDOWK3ROLFLHV¶LQ(0RVVLDORV*
Permanand, R Baeten, T Hervey, eds, Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European Law and 
Policy (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), p 262-':\DWWµ&RPPXQLW\&RPSHWHQFHWR5HJXODWHWKH,QWHUQDO0DUNHW¶
in M Dougan and S Currie, 50 years of the European Treaties: Looking Back and Thinking Forward (Oxford: 
+DUW7+HUYH\µ8SLQ6PRNH&RPPXQLW\DQWLWREDFFRODZDQGSROLF\¶European Law Review 
(2001) 101-125; T Hervey, µ&RPPXQLW\DQG1DWLRQDO&RPSHWHQFHLQ+HDOWKDIWHUTobacco Advertising¶
Common Market Law Review (2001) 1421-1446. 
68
 Probably the best-known area for critique of the CJEU as a forum for making these kinds of judgments 
FRQFHUQVWKH&-(8¶VKXPDQULJKWVMXULVSUXGHQFH6HHVHPLQDOO\-&RSSHOODQG$2¶1HLOOµ7KH(XURSHDQ
&RXUWRI-XVWLFH7DNLQJ5LJKWV6HULRXVO\"¶Common Market Law Review (1992) 669-92; and J H H Weiler 
DQG1/RFNKDUWµ³7DNLQJ5LJKWV6HULRXVO\´6HULRXVO\7KH(XURSHDQ&RXUWDQGLWV)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWV
-XULVSUXGHQFH¶Common Market Law Review (1995) 51-94 and 579-6HHDOVRHJ'53KHODQµ5LJKWWR
Life of the Unborn v Promotion of Trade in Services: The European Court of Justice and the Normative Shaping 
RIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶Modern Law Review (1992) 670-%GH:LWWHµ7KH3DVWDQG)XWXUH5ROHRIWKH
European Court of Justice in the Protection RI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶LQ3$OVWRQHGThe EU and Human Rights 
(Oxford: OUP, 1999). 
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µLQWHOOLJHQWSXUSRVLYHUHFRQQHFWLRQ¶ DQGµSURGXctive disconnection¶, could provide a 
yardstick by which to assess whether the Court is properly discharging such responsibility. 
 
Objection 50RVWRIWKH(8¶VSXEOLFKHDOWKSROLF\LQYROYHVRQO\SROLF\RUDWEHVWVRIWODZ
The scope for Court involvement is minimal. 
 
ThH(8¶VSXEOLFKHDOWKSROLF\, as discussed so far in this article, defined by reference to 
Article 168 TFEU, LVDGPLQLVWHUHGE\WKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V'*+HDOWKDQG
Consumers (SANCO). DG SANCO seeks to work with various EU agencies69 with 
responsibilities for specific public health fields, such as food safety,70 environmental 
protection71 and communicable diseases72. DG SANCO has had some success, especially in 
awareness-raising of high priority health issues, through operating discrete, niche, public 
health programmes, such as those on cancer73 and HIV/AIDS74. Although the programmes 
have extremely modest budgets, they have provided guidelines and positive incentives for 
change at the national health policy level.75 Nevertheless, as much of this policy is based on 
programmes and soft law, the scope for involvement of the Court in EU health policy in this 
narrow sense is minimal. To what extent can stewardship apply to the Court if its 
adjudicatory role in EU public health policy is so minimal? 
 
To the objection that much of EU public health policy does not involve hard law, and so 
&RXUWLQYROYHPHQWLVPLQLPDOZHPLJKWREVHUYHWKDWLQDGGLWLRQWRWKH(8¶VSXEOLFKHDOWK
policy in this narrow sense, many other policies directly relevant to public health also fall 
within the scope of EU activity. For example, EU law and policy on illicit drugs has been 
                                                 
69
 For discussion of the roles of agencies in the EU see, e.g., D Geradin, R Muños and N Petit, eds, Regulation 
though agencies in the EU: a new paradigm of European governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005); Vos, 
supra n 51 (Hart, 1999); O De Schutter, N Lebessis and J Paterson, eds, Governance in the European Union 
(Luxembourg: European Communities, 2001). 
70
 The European Food Safety Authority http://www.efsa.europa.eu/ (accessed Jan 2011). See Vos and Wendler, 
supra n 51, (Intersentia, 2006); C Ansell and D Vogel, supra n 51. 
71
 The European Environment Agency http://www.eea.europa.eu/ (accessed Jan 2011). See D A Westbrook, 
µ(QYLURQPHQWDO3ROLF\LQWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\2EVHUYDWLRQVRQWKH(XURSHDQ(QYLURQPHQW$JHQF\¶
Harvard Environmental Law Review '&KDOPHUVµ,QKDELWDQWVLQWKHILHOGRI(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\
EnvironmeQWDO/DZ¶Columbia Journal of European Law (1998-99) 39-79.  
72
 The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/Pages/home.aspx 
(accessed Jan 2011). See Greer, supra n 49 and H Elliott, S L Greer, D K Jones, supra n 49.  
73
 Resolution of the Council and Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within 
&RXQFLORI-XO\RQµ(XURSHDJDLQVW&DQFHU¶2-&'HFLVLRQ((& RQµ(XURSH
DJDLQVW&DQFHU¶2-/'HFLVLRQ((&RQµ(XURSHDJDLQVW&DQFHU¶2-/
'HFLVLRQ(&RQµ(XURSHDJDLQVW&DQFHU¶2-/Council Recommendation of 2 December 
2003 on cancer screening OJ 2003 L 327/34, now funded by European Parliament and Council Decision 
1350/2007/EC establishing a second programme of Community action in the field of health (2008-13) OJ 2007 
L 301/3 . For discussion, sHH/7UXEHN01DQFHDQG7+HUYH\µ7KH&RQVWUXFWLRQRID+HDOWKLHUEurope: 
/HVVRQVIURPWKH)LJKWDJDLQVW&DQFHU¶Wisconsin International Law Journal (2008) 804-43. 
74
 'HFLVLRQ((&µ(XURSH$JDLQVW$,'6¶2-/'HFLVLRQµ(XURSH$JDLQVW$,'6¶
OJ 1996 L 95/16; European Parliament and Council Decision 1786/2002/EC adopting a programme of 
Community action in the field of public health 2003-¶2-/European Commission, 
Communication on Combating HIV/AIDS in the European Union and neighbouring countries, 2009 -2013 
COM(2009) 569 final, funded by European Parliament and Council Decision 1350/2007/EC establishing a 
second programme of Community action in the field of health (2008-13) OJ 2007 L 301/3. 
75
 Trubek, Nance and Hervey, supra n 73; L Trubek, T Oliver, C-M Liang, M Mokrohisky, and T Campbell, 
µ+RZ5HJXODWRU\)UDPHZRUNV)LJKW&DQFHU7ZR([DPSOHVIURPWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶
(August 25, 2010) 14 Journal of Health Care Law and Policy, (2010); University of Wisconsin Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 1128. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665187 (accessed Jan 2011). 
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GHYHORSHGZLWKLQLWVSROLF\RQµIUHHGRPVHFXULW\DQGMXVWLFH¶76 Responsibility for the 
(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶VERUGHUVDYLWDOGHIHQFHDJDLQVWVPXJJOLQJRf narcotics and tobacco, 
resides with DG Justice. (8IRRGVDIHW\SROLF\DQGSROLF\RQWKH(8¶VIRRGVXSSO\
important for public health questions such as obesity,77 has been developed through the 
common agricultural policy, and responsibility for food safety now resides with the European 
Food Safety Authority.78 Public health research, of which the European Union is now a major 
funder, is the responsibility of DG Research, while consistent Europe-wide information on 
health and its determinants is collected by EUROSTAT.79 Health and safety at work is 
covered by DG Employment.80 The EU¶V long-standing environmental policy, with a 
significant body of environmental law involving matters such as air and water quality;81 
waste disposal;82 and noise pollution,83 all with direct consequences for public health, falls 
under the auspices of DG Environment. Several of these policy areas, which relate to the 
(8¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRSXEOLFKHDOWKSURWHFWLRQDQGSURPRWLRQLQFOXGHELQGLQJOHJDOQRUPV
and therefore there is scope for the Court to be involved in their interpretation and application 
through its jurisdiction, especially that under Article 267 TFEU. Where the Court interprets 
that law, we can consider the extent to which it complies with the obligations of stewardship. 
 
Secondly, though, and more important, in terms of the contribution of the Court to public 
health protection or promotion within the EU, is the interface between internal market law 
and public health. Internal market law aims to create and sustain the conditions of free 
movement of the factors of production, and free and fair competition, within the geographical 
territory of the EU. Because of relationships between public health and free availability or 
free circulation of certain types of products or services which may jeopardise public health, 
                                                 
76
 Council of the European Union, EU Drugs Strategy 2005-2012 22 November 2004, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/04/st15/st15074.en04.pdf (accessed Jan 2011); EU Drugs Action Plan 
for 2009-2012 OJ 2008 C 326/7; European Parliament and Council Decision 1150/2007/EC establishing for the 
period 2007-WKHVSHFLILFSURJUDPPHµ'UXJSUHYHQWLRQDQGLQIRUPDWLRQ¶DVSDUWRIWKH*HQHUDO3URJUDPPH
µ)XQGDPHQWDO5LJKWVDQG-XVWLFH¶2-/(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWDQG&RXQFLORegulation 
1920/2006/EC on the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction OJ 2006 L 376/1; Council 
Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal 
acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug trafficking OJ 2004 L 335/8; Council Joint Action 96/698/JHA on 
cooperation between customs authorities and business organizations in combating drug trafficking OJ 1996 L 
322/3. ,WDSSHDUVWKDWWKH(8¶VDQWL-drugs policy is now also being developed in the context of EU citizenship 
and freedom to provide services in the internal market, see Case C-137/09 Josemans v Burgemeester van 
Maastricht Judgment of 16 December 2010, nyr in ECR. 
77
 Faculty of Public Health, A CAP on health: The impact of the EU Common Agricultural Policy on public 
health (London: Faculty of Public Health, 2007). 
78
 See above n 70. 
79
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ (accessed Jan 2011); McKee M, Ryan J. 
Monitoring health in Europe: opportunities, challenges and progress 13 (3 Suppl) European Journal of Public 
Health (2003) 1-4. 
80
 With significant involvement of the European Agency for Health and Safety at Work 
http://osha.europa.eu/en/front-page (accessed Jan 2011) and the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/ (accessed Jan 2011). 
81
 Includes European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality and cleaner air for 
Europe OJ 2008 L 152/1; Council Directive 96/62/EC on ambient air quality assessment and management OJ 
1996 L 296/55; and Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy OJ 2000 L 327/1. 
82
 Includes European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/98/EC on waste and repealing certain Directives 
OJ 2008 L 312/3. 
83
 Includes Directive 2002/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2002 relating to the 
assessment and management of environmental noise OJ 2002 L 189/12. 
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internal market law exerts a major influence on public health.84 This influence is both in 
terms of general safety of products and services, and in terms of specific products which have 
a particularly detrimental effect upon public health; and services, such as advertising services, 
related to those products. In particular, the application of internal market law to tobacco and 
alcohol85 has had profound implications for national laws, regulations and administrative 
practices and policies dealing with those products, and the advertisement of these products, as 
part of national public health policies.86  
 
Internal market law thus represents the most important site of engagement of the Court with 
public health. Internal market law is not simply deregulatory. It allows for the protection of 
public interests other than the interest in free trade and open competition. But national rules, 
administrative practices or policies that have the effect of impeding cross-border trade in 
goods or services have to be justified within the terms of internal market law.87 The Court is 
charged with oversight of that process and the balancing of values it implies. Through 
applying legal principles, such as that of non-discrimination and proportionality, in 
determining whether national public health policies are justified, the Court determines the 
extent to which public health interests can be articulated, and protected, within the constraints 
of internal market law. This broad sense of EU public health policy is thus where a 
stewardship obligation could most obviously apply to the Court in the field of public health. 
 
Moreover, in the context of internal market law, there is a stronger reason than the 
µUHJXODWRU\ODJ¶SKHQRPHQRQGLVFXVVHGDERYHWRDGRSWDGLIIHUHQWFDOLEUDWLRQRIRUDSSURDFK
to intelligent purposive reconnection/creative interpretation and to productive 
disconnectiRQOLWHUDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWRWKDWSURYLGHGE\WKHµVWHZDUGVKLS¶PRGHO ± DµVXSHU-
VWHZDUGVKLS¶PRGHO. The reason concerns the constitutional position of the core provisions of 
directly effective88 internal market law. Being part of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, these measures of EU law cannot be amended except by Treaty revision, 
and in fact the core provisions have not been amended89 in the entire lifetime of what is now 
the EU.90 Treaty revision involves an even more difficult process than adoption of EU 
                                                 
84
 Recently, for instance, the CJEU has considered whether national rules, prohibiting the import of blood 
products from donations which were not entirely unpaid, breach internal market law, see Case C-421/09 
Humanplasma 9 December 2010, nyr in ECR. 
85
 See, e.g., Cases C-1/90 & 176/90 Aragonesa [1991] ECR I-4151; Case C-189/95 Franzén [1997] ECR I-
5909; Case C-405/98 Gourmet International Products [2001] ECR I-1795; Case C-262/02 Commission v 
France (Loi Evin)[2004] ECR I-6569; Case C-429/02 Bacardi France v TF1 [2004] ECR I-6613; Case C-
434/04 Ahokainen and Leppik [2006] ECR I-9171; Case 170/04 Rosengren [2007] ECR I-4071; Case C-186/05 
Commission v Sweden (Alcohol Monopoly) [2007] ECR I-129.  At least arguably, older case law such as Case 
120/78 Cassis de Dijon supra n 7, Case 75/81 Blesgen [1982] ECR 1211 and Case 178/84 Commission v 
Germany (Beer Purity) [1987] ECR 1227 also falls into this category. 
86
 For instance, internal market law forced Finland to dismantle elements of its state alcohol monopoly and, 
shortly afterwards, it reduced domestic prices as a consequence of its inability to block imports of cheap drinks 
from nearby Estonia. As predicted, there has been a steep rise in deaths from alcohol-related disorders, see A 
Koski, R Sirén, E Vuori, K PoikolaLQHQµ$OFRKROWD[FXWVDQGLQFUHDVHLQDOFRKRO-positive sudden deaths: a 
time-VHULHVLQWHUYHQWLRQDQDO\VLV¶Addiction (2007) 362-8. Proposals in 2009 by the Scottish government 
and the chief medical officer for England to impose a minimum price on alcohol prompted the proposed use of 
(8OLWLJDWLRQWRFKDOOHQJHVXFKPHDVXUHVVHH00F.HH3%HOFKHUDQG7+HUYH\µ5HGXFLQJKDUPIURP
DOFRKRO¶British Medical Journal 2009;338: b1191. 
87
 Article 36 TFEU; Articles 52 and 62 TFEU; Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, supra n 7; Case C-55/94 Gebhardt 
[1995] ECR I-4165. 
88
 That is, a measure that can be relied upon in litigation before a national court. 
89
 Save by renumbering. 
90
 :LWQHVVWKHGLIILFXOWLHVRIWKH)UHQFKWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHµ$QJOR-6D[RQPRGHO¶ZDVKHDGHGRIIE\WKH7UHDW\RI
Lisbon ± DOWKRXJKWKHUHDUHQHZSURYLVLRQVDERXWµVHUYLFHVRIJHQHUDOLQWHUHVW¶DQGDOWKRXJKWKHWHUP
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legislation, with every Member State enjoying a veto. In practice, therefore, creative 
interpretation is a primary means by which these measures of EU law can be altered through 
time and in response to new challenges or developments, including those in the public health 
field. 
 
IQWHUQDOPDUNHWODZHQMR\VDSRVLWLRQRIµFRQVWLWXWLRQDODV\PPHWU\¶LQWKH(8¶VOHJDORUGHU
As several authors, notably Fritz Scharpf,91 have argued, the law of the internal market 
embeds a constitutional favouring of free trade interests as opposed to other interests, 
LQFOXGLQJWKRVHRIµVRFLDO(XURSH¶VXFKDVHPSOR\PHQWFRQGLWLRQVDQGVRFLDOZHOIDUH
SURYLVLRQ7KHµFRQVWLWXWLRQDODV\PPHWU\¶FDQDOVREHVDLGWRH[WHQGWRLQWHUHVWVVXFKDV
public health protection and promotion. While I have been (and remain) sceptical about the 
µVWURQJ¶YHUVLRQRIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDODV\PPHWU\DUJXPHQWLQEULHIEHFDXVHLWUHIOHFWVDQ
insufficiently nuanced understanding of the way that the jurisprudence of the Court actually 
works LQSUDFWLFH,WKLQNWKDWDµZHDN¶YHUVLRQRIWKHDUJXPHQWVWDQGV,WLVQRWWKDW(8ODZ
as interpreted and applied by the Court and national courts, is always deregulatory and 
always favours free trade interests over other interests. The possibility to justify restrictive 
regulatory activities remains available. It is the fact that the discussion of the matter becomes 
framed by the discourse of internal market lawDQGLQGHHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH(8¶V
membership of the World Trade Organization, also by the discourse of WTO law. This 
framing effect may discourage or impede courts from articulating arguments on any basis 
other than that of liberalism, and result in the resolution of disputes within a pluralist society 
articulated only in terms of free trade and markets.  As I expressed it in the context of the 
Diane Blood litigation, concerning export of frozen sperm from the UK to a Belgian IVF 
clinic in circumstances where the use of the sperm would have been unlawful in the UK: 
 
³the applicability of E[U] law may operate to constrain, or to skew in certain directions, debates 
(including those carried out through litigation) in the Member States concerned with [public 
health]. «WKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI(>8@ law may encourage or at least enable national courts to 
resolve cases by applying economic concepts, for instance relating to trade in goods and 
services. The European Union legal order, with its underlying principles of market openness, 
and conceptualisation of individuals as market actors, might aid this type of approach. Indeed, 
the Blood case may be an example of such an interplay between national and European 
UHJXODWRU\RUGHUV7KH&RXUWRI$SSHDO¶VMXGJPHQWPDNHVVFDQWUHIHUHQFHWRWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQ
issue, perhaps sending a signal that it vLHZHG'LDQH%ORRG¶VULJKWVLQ(>8@ law as indisputable, 
which was clearly not the case. « it was at least arguable that a public interest justification 
                                                                                                                                                        
µFRPSHWLWLRQ¶DORQHZDVUHPRYHGIURPWKHSURYLVLRQDERXWWKHDLPVRIWKH(8WREHUHSODFHGZLWKDQDLPRIµD
KLJKO\FRPSHWLWLYHVRFLDOPDUNHWHFRQRP\¶Article 3 (3) TEU. 
91
 )6FKDUSIµ$1HZ6RFLDO&RQWUDFW"1HJDWLYHDQG3RVLWLYH,QWHJUDWLRQLQWKH3ROLWLFDO(FRQRP\RI(XURSHDQ
:HOIDUH6WDWHV¶(8, :RUNLQJ3DSHU56&)6FKDUSIµ7KH(XURSHDQ6RFLDO0RGHO&RSLQJZLWKWKH
&KDOOHQJHVRI'LYHUVLW\¶Journal of Common Market Studies (2002) 645-)6FKDUSIµ7KH-RLQW-Decision 
7UDS5HYLVLWHG¶Journal of Common Market Studies (2006), 845-864)6FKDUSIµ/HJLWLPDF\LQWKH
0XOWLOHYHO(XURSHDQ3ROLW\¶)3,I*:RUNLQJ3DSHUwww.mpifg.de/publications/workingpapers. See also, 
e.g., &-RHUJHVµ(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLF/DZWKH1DWLRQ-State DQGWKH0DDVWULFKW7UHDW\¶LQ5'HKRXVVHHG
Europe after Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union (München: Beck, 1994); more recently, C Joerges and Rödl, 
µ2QWKHµ6RFLDO'HILFLW¶RIWKH(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ3URMHFWDQGLWV3HUSHWXDWLRQWKURXJKWKH(&-MXGJPHQts in 
Viking and Laval¶5(&212QOLQH:RUNLQJ3DSHU
www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html; &2IIHµ7KH(XURSHDQ0RGHORI
µ6RFLDO¶&DSLWDOLVP&DQLW6XUYLYH(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ"¶Journal of Political Philosophy (2003), 437-469; 
L Moreno & B Palier µ7KH(XURSHDQL]DWLRQRI:HOIDUH3DUDGLJPVKLIWVDQGVRFLDOSROLF\UHIRUPV¶LQ37D\ORU-
Gooby, ed, Ideas and Welfare State Reform in Western Europe, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); G. 
'DYLHVµ7KHSURFHVVDQGVLGH-HIIHFWVRIKDUPRQLVDWLRQRI(XURSHDQZHOIDUHVWDWHV¶-HDQ0RQQHW:RUNLQJ
Paper, No. 02/06, 1-64. 
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FRXOGKDYHEHHQIRXQGWRVXSSRUWWKH$XWKRULW\¶VUHIXVDOWRDOORZ'LDQH%ORRGWRH[SRUWWKH
sperm.92 
 
The way that EU law (and indeed WTO law) frames non-free trade interests, such as public 
health protection and promotion, is as exceptions to the (liberal) norm of freedom of 
movement.93 Stewardship obligations in the public health context require a quite different 
IUDPLQJ7KHSRVVLELOLW\RIµUHFRQQHFWLRQ¶RIWKHJDSEHWZHHQHPHUJHQWXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRI
what is needed for public health protection with the relevant internal market law is not 
feasible through legislative amendment ± the place of the inWHUQDOPDUNHWLVµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\
HPEHGGHG¶ZLWKLQ(8ODZ7KLV embeddedness VXJJHVWVWKDWWKH&RXUWLIH[HUFLVLQJDµVXSHU-
VWHZDUGVKLS¶DSSURDFKVKRXOGKHVLWDWHWRDGRSWOLWHUDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKHUHOHYDQW
regulatory system/strategy (i.e., internal market law), where these will not and cannot protect 
SXEOLFKHDOWKRQWKHEDVLVWKDWµWKLVLVIRUWKHOHJLVODWXUHWRIL[¶ The disconnection between 
LQWHUQDOPDUNHWODZDQGSXEOLFKHDOWKSURWHFWLRQLVµXQSURGXFWLYH¶EHFDXVHWhe EU legislature 
FDQQRWµIL[¶LQWHUQDOPDUNHWODZLQWKDWVHQVHThusLIWKH&RXUWLVWRDFWDVDµVXSHU-VWHZDUG¶ 
we would expect from the Court greater creative interpretation of internal market law, so as 
WRµUHFRQQHFW¶LQWHUQDOPDUNHWODZZLWKHPHUJHQWXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIKRZEHVt to protect and 
promote public health within the EU.  
 
2EMHFWLRQµ6XSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶FDQQRWVHUYHDVDPRGHOWRDVVHVVWKHFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKH
Court in the field of internal market law, because stewardship and the internal market do not 
share a common frame of reference. 
 
7KHILQDOREMHFWLRQWRDSSO\LQJµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶DVDPRGHORUDQDO\WLFDOIUDPHZRUNWR
assess the work of the Court of Justice of the European Union in determining the balance 
between free trade/fair competition and public health, discussed in this article, relates to the 
point above. It FRQFHUQVWKHYHU\GLIIHUHQWIUDPHVRIUHIHUHQFHRIµVWHZDUGVKLS¶DQGµWKH
LQWHUQDOPDUNHW¶, encapsulated in the following quotations: 
 
µ2QFHZHYHQWXUHEH\RQGWKHJDWHGDQGVHFXUHFRQGLWLRQVRIDFRPmunity of rights, 
stewardship might prove to be a hostage to fortune «¶94  
 
µ7KH>(XURSHDQ@8QLRQVKDOORIIHULWVFLWL]HQVDQDUHDRIIUHHGRPVHFXULW\DQGMXVWLFHZLWKRXW
LQWHUQDOIURQWLHUVLQZKLFKWKHIUHHPRYHPHQWRISHUVRQVLVHQVXUHG«7KH>(XURSHDQ@Union 
shall establish an internal market95 «7KHLQWHUQDOPDUNHWVKDOOFRPSULVHDQDUHDZLWKRXW
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
HQVXUHG«¶96. 
 
7KHPRGHORIµVWHZDUGVKLS¶RIIHUHGE\%URZQVZRUGHWDORSHrates essentially within a 
IUDPHZRUNRIFRQVWUDLQWRIVWDWHRUSXEOLFDFWLRQZLWKLQDFORVHGµJDWHGDQGVHFXUH¶
                                                 
92
 7+HUYH\µ%X\%DE\WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDQGUHJXODWLRQRIKXPDQUHSURGXFWLRQ¶Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies (1998) 207-233, at 230-1. 
93
 See also, adopting a particular version of individualism, A Somek, Individualism: An Essay on the Authority 
of the European Union (Oxford: OUP, 2008), especially p 7; 10-11; p 82-137; 184-$6RPHNµ7KH2ZORI
0LQHUYD&RQVWLWXWLRQDO'LVFRXUVH%HIRUHLWV&RQFOXVLRQ¶0/5HY-89, at 485, and ftn 38. 
94
 5%URZQVZRUGµ6R:KDW'RHVWKH:RUOG1HHG1RZ"5HIOHFWLRQVRQ5HJXODWLQJ7HFKQRORJLHV¶LQ5
Brownsword and K Yeung, eds, Regulating Technologies: Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and 
Technological Fixes (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2008), p 47. 
95
 Article 1 TEU. 
96
 Article 26 (2) TFEU. 
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µcommunity of rights¶ (a state). The main addressees of stewardship are public authorities97 
and individuals ZKRPD\EHPRUHRUOHVVKHDOWK\DQGWKHLUµSHUVRQDOYDOXHV¶%\FRQWUDVWWKH
way that the Court, when operating within the frame of reference of internal market law, 
conceptualises individuals (with their particular health needs and personal values) is as 
FRQVXPHUVDQGSURGXFHUVRSHUDWLQJZLWKLQDQRSHQµZLWKRXWLQWHUQDOIURQWLHUV¶µLQWHUQDO
PDUNHW¶,QGLYLGXDOVDUHQRWFRQFHSWXDOLVHGKHUHDVKXPDQEHLQJVZLWKKHDOWKQHHGVDQG
choices relating to health. This conceptualisation or framing is inherent in the nature of 
internal market law, or at least internal market law as developed hitherto by the Court. Thus, 
WKH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQLQLQWHUQDOPDUNHWODZDQGWKHLGHDRIµVWHZDUGVKLS¶HDFKLQYROYHD
totally different frame of reference ± one is about values within an implicitly closed 
FRPPXQLW\WKHRWKHULVDERXWWKHLPSOLFLWO\YDOXHGRSHQQHVVRIWKH(8¶VLQWHUQDOPDUNHW,I
ZHWU\WRDSSO\µVWHZDUGVKLS¶WRWKH&RXUWthe objection is that we will essentially be 
requiring the Court to ignore the constitutional framework within which it is obliged to 
operate, and apply a different framework (which respects the values encapsulated in the idea 
RIµVWHZDUGVKLS¶LQFOXGLQJQRWRQO\DXWRQRP\EXWDOVRVXEVWDQWLYHHTXDOLW\ZKLFKPHDQV
different treatment for those who are more vulnerable). It is not legitimate to criticize an 
apple for not being a pear! 
 
,QUHVSRQVHWRWKLVREMHFWLRQZHPLJKWREVHUYHWKDWµVWHZDUGVKLS¶LVXVHGSUHFLVHO\WRMXVWLI\
DQGUHVSRQGWRDQµRYHUO\LQGLYLGXDOLVWLFIRFXVWKDWKDVHPHUJHGDVFDQRQLFDO«RYHUUHFHQW
GHFDGHV¶98 The very nature of public health goods is such that they can often outweigh liberal 
ideas about protecting individual liberties and freedoms,99 including those pertaining to the 
FUHDWLRQDQGPDLQWHQDQFHRIWKH(8¶VLQWHUQDOPDUNHW6RMXVWDVµVWHZDUGVKLS¶LVprecisely 
about justifying or assessing departures from freedoms within a particular state, so we could 
use the same sort of reasoningLQWKHPRGLILHGIRUPRIµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶RXWOLQHGDERYHto 
justify departures from freedoms (free movement, freedom to trade) within the internal 
market, and the individual rights in EU internal market law, that the Court must interpret and 
national courts must apply. Understood thus, DµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶REOLJDWLRQZRXOGnot only 
empower, but also require, the Court to reframe disputes concerning the balance between free 
WUDGHDQGSXEOLFKHDOWKVRDVWRFRQVLGHUE\UHIHUHQFHWRWKHµODGGHURILQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ZKHWKHU
restrictions on free trade (DWWKHµdo nothing¶UXQJRIWhe ladder) are justified, and, by 
UHIHUHQFHWRWKHµEHVW-OHYHOODGGHURILQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ZKRJHWVWRGHFLGH 
 
By way of illustration, this final section of the article FRQVLGHUVKRZµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶DV
outlined above, could be used as a standpoint for analysis and critique of the Court in the 
context of its jurisprudence on public health protection within EU internal market law. 
                                                 
97
 Of course, in the public health domain, we might wonder whether the state/public domain is really so distinct 
DVLWSHUKDSVRQFHZDVIURPWKHSULYDWHGRPDLQ)RULQVWDQFHVHYHUDOµ%HYHULGJHPRGHO¶QDWLRQDOKHDOWK
authorities within the EU have experimented with contracting out services to private actors. The Bismarkian 
model health authorities have always used (at least quasi) private actors, such as insurance organisations. For 
discussion of the different arrangements for public health cDUHLQWKH(8¶V0HPEHU6WDWHVVHHHJ:Palm, J 
Nickless, H Lewalle, A Coheur, Implications of Recent Jurisprudence on the Coordination of Health Care 
Protection Systems %UXVVHOV$,09+DW]RSRXORVµ+HDOWK/DZDQG3ROLF\7KH,PSDFWRIWKH(8¶, in G 
De Búrca, ed, EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity, (Oxford: OUP, 2005) 111±168; M 
Steffen, Health Governance in Europe: Issues, Challenges and Theories (London and New York: Routledge, 
2005). M Flear, Does the Free Movement of Persons Cause Change in Healthcare Systems? Unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK, 2006. 
98
 Baldwin et al, supra n 9, p 114. 
99
 Baldwin et al, supra n 9, p 114. 
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Obviously the examples discussed here are selective. They are based on a review of the 
&RXUW¶VFDVHODZLQSXEOLFKHDOWKILHOGV, from the 1950s-2009.100  
 
In its early jurisprudence, the Court recognised that public health was essentially a matter for 
national administrations, allowing a wide margin of discretion to Member States in this 
respect. As the Court put it in a case involving national rules restricting the sale of medicinal 
products to pharmacies,  
 
µLWLVIRUWKH0HPEHU6WDWHVZLWKLQWKHOLPLWVLPSRVHGE\WKH7UHDW\WRGHFLGHZKDWGHJUHHRI
protection [for human health] they intend to assure and in particular how strict the checks to 
EHFDUULHGRXWDUHWREH¶101  
 
7KH&RXUW¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQKHUHRILQWHUQDOPDUNHWODZmay be characterised as intelligent 
purposive reconnection. At this point in time, there are no EU level rules on selling 
arrangements for pharmaceuticals, nor is the creation of such rules by the EU legislature 
HQYLVDJHG7KH&RXUWWKXVRSHUDWHVZLWKLQDµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶PRGHOE\LQWHUSUHWLQJ
internal market law to give significant regulatory space to national administrations. The 
QDWLRQDOSROLF\DWLVVXHKHUHLVUHODWLYHO\KLJKXSWKHµODGGHURILQWHUYHQWLRQ¶LQYROYLQJDde 
facto restriction of individual choice, by restricting the places in which certain products, 
deemed by the national administration to be potentially harmful to public health, can lawfully 
be sold. But the restriction of choice is justified by reference to understanding at the time of 
the harm or potential harm to public health were pharmaceuticals to be sold to consumers 
outside the setting of a pharmacy, where professionally qualified staff can give tailored 
advice to offset the information deficit that the consumer of pharmaceuticals has, and to 
prevent a future charge on national healthcare systems if pharmaceuticals are consumed and 
KDUPWRWKHFRQVXPHU¶VKHDOWKHQVXHV7KHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUWKDWH[WHQWRILQWHUYHQWLRQ
with individual liberty (to trade) is justified ± and, crucially, who gets to decide ± is informed 
also b\WKHµEHVW-OHYHOODGGHURILQWHUYHQWLRQ¶,QWKHDEVHQFHRIHLWKHU(8OHYHORU
internationally agreed rules on selling arrangements for pharmaceuticals, and given the fact 
that pharmaceuticals markets were essentially national, the decision to permit national level 
rules or policies is justified. 
 
However, mindful that allowing too wide a discretion to Member States in this respect would 
KDYHFRPSOHWHO\XQGHUPLQHGWKH&RXUW¶VGULYHWRFUHDWHWKHLQWHUQDOPDUNHWLQJRRGV102 the 
Court has also, through the principle of proportionality, developed some control over national 
public health protection policies. National regulation is permitted in EU law, subject to the 
proviso that such regulation is proportionate to the aims of the internal market.103 There are 
essentially two versions of the proportionality test (a stronger and a weaker test),104 and the 
                                                 
100
 I am grateful to Michelle Dunning for her research assistance under the University of Sheffield CILASS 
SURE Summer Intern Scheme 2009. 
101
 Case C-62/90 Commission v Germany [1992] ECR I-2575, para 10. This case dates from the early 1990s. It 
echoes earlier cases dating back to the 1970s: Case 104/75 De Peijper [1976] ECR I-613; Case 174/82 Sandoz 
[1983] ECR 2445; Case 227/82 van Bennekom [1983] ECR 3883; Case 97/83 Melkunie [1984] ECR 2367; Case 
247/84 Motte [1985] ECR 3887; Case 304/84 Muller [1986] ECR 1511. 
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 If Member States could adopt any national policies they wished, simply by invoking the grounds, however 
spurious, of human health protection, then the single market would be easily thwarted by protectionist national 
rules. 
103
 Case 272/80 Biologische Producten [1981] ECR 3227; Case 266 & 267/87 R v Royal Pharmaceutical 
Society of Great Britain, ex parte Association of Pharmaceutical Importers [1989] ECR 1295; Case C-60/89 
Monteil [1991] ECR I-1547; Case 293/94 Brandsma [1996] ECR 3159. 
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 W Sauter, µ6HUYLFHVRIJHQHUDOHFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWDQGXQLYHUVDOVHUYLFHLQ(8ODZ¶European Law Review 
(2008) 167-193. In the weakest version, a measure that is prima facie suitable to protect public health, and is not 
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Court has applied different versions at different points in time to its scrutiny of the balance 
between free trade as implied by the logic of the internal market and protection of public 
health.  
 
From the beginning of the 1970s, into the mid 1980s, the Court applied the weaker version of 
the proportionality test to its scrutiny of national measures designed to protect public health. 
For instance, in cases involving national rules designed to protect against known and agreed 
risks to human health, e.g., from pesticides in food,105 or from certain levels of active 
coliform bacteria and active micro-organisms in milk products,106 the Court stresses that there 
is a known risk to human health, that harmonised EU law on the products concerned is 
incomplete and that therefore different Member States may adopt different approaches 
without breaching EU law. For instance, the Court explained: 
 
µ,QVo far as the relevant [EU] rules do not cover certain pesticides, the Member States may 
regulate the presence of residues of those pesticides on foodstuffs in a way which varies from 
one country to another according to the climatic conditions, the normal diet of the population 
DQGWKHLUVWDWHRIKHDOWK¶107 
 
The weaker version of proportionality also applied in cases where the science was less clear. 
For instance, in Rewe-Zentralefinanz eGmbh v Landwirtschaftskammer,108 the Court held that 
the different treatment of imported and domestic products does not breach EU law, so long as 
effective measures prevent the distribution of contaminated domestic products and there is 
reason to believe that there is a risk of harmful organisms spreading without inspection of 
imported products.109 There was no need to prove the risk ± it was enough to show that it was 
reasonable for the national administration to believe it existed. This softer version of 
proportionality continued in cases throughout the 1980s.110  
 
Again we can say that the Court adopts intelligent purposive reconnection here, leaving 
regulatory space for national administrations to protect and promote public health within the 
FRQWH[WRIWKHµOHWWHU¶RILQWHUQDOPDUNHWODZ The restriction or elimination of choice entailed 
in the regulatory structures at issue in these cases (which involved matters such as bans on 
DGGLWLYHVLQIRRGZKLFKLVUHODWLYHO\KLJKRQWKHµLQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHU¶LVMXVWLILHGE\WKH
                                                                                                                                                        
manifestly disproportionate, is permissible. In the strictest version, only the least restrictive means of protecting 
public health are permissible, and the relevant body must show that no other imaginable measure could achieve 
that objective with a lesser detrimental effect to free trade. 
105
 Case 94/83 Heijn BV [1984] ECR 3263 and Case 54/85 Mirepoix [1986] ECR 1067. 
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 Case 97/83 Melkunie, supra n 101,. 
107
 Case 54/85 Mirepoix, supra n 105, para 15. 
108
 Case 4/75 [1975] ECR 843, involving an inspection system to protect plant health. 
109
 Para 8. 
110
 See, e.g., Case 174/82 Sandoz supra n 101; Case 53/80 Eyssen [1981] ECR 409; Case 247/84 Motte, supra n 
101, and Case 304/84 Muller, supra n 101. In Case 174/82 Sandoz, supra n 101, the CJEU reasoned, µ,QYLHZRQ
the one hand of scientific uncertainties and on the other of the fact that the harmfulness of vitamins depends on 
the quantity absorbed with the whole nutrition of a person it is not possible to say with certainty whether any 
food to which vitamins have been added is harmful or not¶DQGµScientific research does not appear to be 
sufficiently advanced to be able to determine with certainty WKHFULWLFDOTXDQWLWLHVDQGWKHSUHFLVHHIIHFWV¶SDUDV
10-11, italics added). Similar reasoning is found in Case 53/80 Eyssen [1981] ECR 409: µ,WLVLQGHHGDFFHSWHG
that the increasingly widespread use of that substance, not only in milk but also in numerous preserved products 
, has revealed the need, both at national level in certain countries and at international level, to study the 
problem of the risk which the consumption of products containing the substance presents , or may present , to 
KXPDQKHDOWK¶DQGµDOWKRXJKthose studies have not as yet enabled absolutely certain conclusions to be drawn 
regarding the maximum quantity of nisin which a person may consume daily withRXWVHULRXVULVNWRKLVKHDOWK¶, 
(para 13). 
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reasonable belief that serious risks to human health are present, although in precautionary 
examples such as these the case is less strongly persuasive than that outlined in the example 
DERYH$JDLQWKHµEHVW-OHYHOODGGHURILQWHUYHQWLRQ¶JLYHQWKDWWKHUHLVDODFNRI(8OHYHO
regulation of the matters concerned, indicates that national levels are the appropriate level 
within which the procedures whereby the different interests at stake are balanced should take 
place.  
 
However, by the early 1990s, the Court began to modify its jurisprudence in this field, by 
adding a procedural dimension to its application of proportionality. So in a series of cases 
involving the addition of sorbic acid;111 the nutrient L-Carnitine;112 and the nutrient Co-
enzyme Q10,113 WKH&RXUW¶VSRVLWLRQPRYHGWRZDUGVDVWULFWHUYHUVLon of proportionality, by 
scrutinizing the transparency, speed and accessibility of the national marketing authorisation 
procedures at issue. The context for this development is the fact that the EU had by this time 
incrementally developed its own regulatory capacity to adopt law and policy on at least some 
sources of risk to human health, in particular within the food chain.114 Originally following 
decisions taken by Member States, the EU began to develop its own idea of scientific 
knowledge115 informing tolerable (and intolerable) levels of risk concerning human health 
ZLWKLQWKHIRRGFKDLQ7KH&RXUW¶VMXULVSUXGHQFHdeveloping an increasingly suspect position 
towards nationally determined versions of hazard, supports this EU level legislative and 
policy development. 
 
,QWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKHTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUFRQVLGHULQJWKHµEHVW-level ladder of 
LQWHUYHQWLRQ¶WKH(8OHYHOLVWKHDSSURSULDWHOHYHOZLWKLQZKLFKGHFLVLRQVDERXWULVNVKRXOG
be made. The products concerned are not the subject of global restrictions or bans on their 
trade.116 But is there sufficient commonality between the Member States of the EU in terms 
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 Case C-24/00 &RPPLVVLRQY)UDQFH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of the contours of the public health problem being tackled here, which is not shared globally, 
so as to justify special EU-level rules protecting the health of a community or group of 
communities beyond that of the nation state (the EU), but falling short of the global 
community? Is there an EU-level law or policy that significantly interfaces with public health 
protection? If there is (the coPPRQDJULFXOWXUDOSROLF\DQGWKH(8¶VIRRGODZSUREDEO\
constitute such policies), WKHQWKH&RXUW¶VDSSURDFKLQVXSSRUWLQJWKHHPHUJHQW(8OHYHOODZ
and policy is justified. We might, for instance, suggest that a European social and cultural 
approach to food additives exists,117 and justifies the EU level of intervention. However, if 
such a case cannot be made out, WKHQDµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶DQDO\VLVZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDW this is 
a matter best left to national levels.  
 
Moreover, the way that the Court reasons in its jurisprudence concerning the interface 
EHWZHHQWKHLQWHUQDOPDUNHWDQGSXEOLFKHDOWKLVLQVXIILFLHQWO\VHQVLWLYHWRWKHµODGGHURI
LQWHUYHQWLRQ¶,QDlarge number of cases concerning food and alcohol labelling,118 the Court 
has consistently held, applying the stronger version of the proportionality test, that providing 
FRQVXPHULQIRUPDWLRQWKHVHFRQGUXQJRIWKHLQWHUYHQWLRQODGGHUDIWHURQO\WKHµGRQRWKLQJ¶
of unregulated free trade) is a proportionate response to public health concerns, and, crucially, 
that anything else is disproportionate. But, as Brownsword et al point out, interventions that 
are information-based (such as nutrition labelling, anti-smoking adverts or drink-driving 
campaigns) may have the effect of increasing social inequalities.119 Labelling of food or 
                                                                                                                                                        
issues/weapons/arms-trade-treaty/7KH81¶V6LQJOH&RQYHQWLRQRQ1DUFRWLF'UXJV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SXUSRVHV7KH81¶V&RQYHQWLRQRQ3V\FKRWURSLF6XEVWDQFHV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http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/psychotropics.html?ref=menuside establishes an international control 
system for psychotropic substances.  
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alcoKROUHOLHVRQWKHFRQVXPHU¶VDELOLW\WRUHDGDQGXQGHUVWDQGWKHODEHOVDQGWUDQVODWHWKH
information presented into choices about which products to consume. More advantaged 
groups in society are more likely to be able to do this and thus avail themselves of health 
protection or promotion advice. Other factors, such as availability, convenience, presentation, 
familiarity, price and palatability, may play a significant role in consumer choices,120 and 
because of this states may justifiably (in a stewardship sense) seek to regulate any or all of 
these through measures higher up the intervention ladder, such as prohibiting certain 
additives or restricting choice through restricting places where products may lawfully be 
sold.121 
 
However, both in cases where the detriments to public health arising from the product or 
service relating to the product are contested122 and in those, such as with respect to tobacco, 
where they are known and agreed upon,123 tKH&RXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJUHPDLQVWUDSSHGZLWKLQWKH
(liberal) frame of constitutional asymmetry, where the individual is conceptualized as a 
consumer within a market, and regulatory activities that restrict free trade must be justified as 
exceptions to the rule of freedom. Given that the EU legislature, or, better, the governments 
of the Member States in Treaty revision processes, in practice are XQDEOHWRµUHFRQQHFW¶WKH
text of the law with scientific and/or social and cultural developments in understanding of 
SXEOLFKHDOWKULVNVWKH&RXUWVKRXOGEHVORZWRDGRSWWKHµSURGXFWLYHGLVFRQQHFWLRQ¶
DSSURDFKEXWUDWKHUVKRXOGµIL[¶WKHGLVFRQQHFWLRQVE\intelligent purposive 
reconnection/FUHDWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRILQWHUQDOPDUNHWODZ7KDWZRXOGEHWRDGRSWDµVXSer-
VWHZDUGVKLS¶DSSURDFK 
 
Conclusion 
 
The article KDVVKRZQWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK%URZQVZRUGHWDO¶VQRWLRQRIVWHZDUGVKLSSURYLGHV
DQDSSURSULDWHDQDO\WLFDOPRGHOIRUFULWLTXHRIWKH(8¶VODZDQGSROLF\LQWKHSXEOLFKHDOWK
field. Having reviewed six key objections to the use of stewardship as such a model, the 
article concludes that stewardship can play such a role, provided that the concept of 
stewardship LVPRGLILHGWRµVXSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶WRWDNHDFFRXQWRIWKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ
the EU and the state. µ6XSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶UHOLHVRQWKHLGHDRIµODGGHUVRILQWHUYHQWLRQ¶WR
assess whether regulatory interventions and restrictions on individual autonomy and choice 
are justified, and whether the relevant policy-making institutions have been involved in a 
particular regulatory decision concerning public health. A preliminary assessment suggests 
that much EU-level law and policy making on public health can be justified by reference to 
this analytical model, although there are some areas where the justification for EU 
involvement has not (yet) been made out. 
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µ6XSHU-VWHZDUGVKLS¶DOVRUHOLHVRQWKHLGHDVRIµintelligent SXUSRVLYHUHFRQQHFWLRQ¶DQG
µSURGXFWLYHGLVFRQQHFWLRQ¶WRDVVHVVZKHWKHUFRXUWVDQGLQSDUWLFXODUWKH&RXUWKDYH
properly exercised their stewardship obligations with respect to judicial decision-making that 
concerns the balance between public health interests and other interests. Given the 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSXEOLFKHDOWKSURWHFWLRQDQGSURPRWLRQDQGWKH(8¶VLQWHUQDOPDUNet 
law, the most important judicial decisions concerning such balancing involve restrictions on 
IUHHWUDGHZLWKLQWKH(8¶VLQWHUQDOPDUNHWWKDWDUHDLPHGWRSURWHFWRUSURPRWHSXEOLFKHDOWK
Such restrictions involve, for instance, limitations on by whom, or when, or where, or how, 
certain products, or advertising services for such products, may be traded. Relevant products 
that may involve hazard to public health include, in particular, blood and human tissue, 
pharmaceuticals, food, alcohol, and tobacco. The place of the law of the internal market 
ZLWKLQWKH(8¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVUHTXLUHVDPXFKJUHDWHUHPSKDVLVRQSXUSRVLYH
UHFRQQHFWLRQWKDQLPSOLHGE\%URZQVZRUG¶VLGHDRIVWHZDUGVKLSDVDSSOLHGWRFRXUWVLQ
national contexts. In a preliminary analysis, the article has shown that, in interpreting internal 
market law, the Court of Justice of the European Union does not always successfully play its 
UROHDVDµVXSHU-VWHZDUG¶RISXEOLFKHDOWKLQWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ 
 
 
